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ABSTRACT
QUANTIFYING VULNERABILITY TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Barry Charles Ezell 
Old Dominion University, 2004 
Director: Dr. Charles Keating
Military and civilian leaders have the responsibility to protect our Nation’s critical 
infrastructure, communities, and symbols of American power from terrorists, home and 
abroad, as well as from natural disasters. To this end, assessments are conducted to 
reduce vulnerability. The literature offers multiple definitions of vulnerability and 
measurement has not been adequately addressed. Thus, the purpose of this research has 
been to develop and deploy a systems-based model that quantifies vulnerability to critical 
infrastructure. This research defines critical infrastructure vulnerability as a measure of 
the susceptibility of critical infrastructure to threat scenarios. Vulnerability is a function 
of 1) threat scenario, 2) protection and 3) importance. Critical infrastructure vulnerability 
is measured by a system’s 1) deterrence, 2) detection, 3) delay and 4) response 
capabilities. Importance implies that some subsystems are more critical to overall system 
performance than other subsystems. A value model was used as the logic construct for 
quantifying vulnerability. Subject-matter experts were queried to establish the shapes of 
value functions and importance (weights) in the model. Another set of subject-matter 
experts are queried to assess a notional clean water system with respect to each protection 
measure within the vulnerability value model. To accomplish this, two simulations are 
executed in the model. The first simulation aggregates expert assessments into one 
assessment. The results are then used as inputs into the vulnerability value portion of the 
model for use in the second simulation where vulnerability is quantified. Results of this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research demonstrate that vulnerability can be quantified and that quantifying 
vulnerability is useful to decision-makers who prefer quantification to qualitative 
treatment of vulnerability. This research is a novel contribution to the body of scholarly 
work by: 1) providing a rigorous method to quantify vulnerability to critical 
infrastructure, 2) introducing the theory of vulnerability, and 3) specifying the theoretical 
relationship between risk and vulnerability. Subject matter experts conclude that there is 
value in the approach put forward in this body of research as it is applied to clean water 
systems, so it may be useful in other critical infrastructures. The research closes with 
directions for further research.
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This dissertation is dedicated to the men and women who protect our Homeland.
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PREFACE
Having been a part of the effort to protect our infrastructure for 18 years as a 
service member of the US Army and nine years of academic research directly related to 
finding ways to harden water and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, the author became interested in researching ways to quantify vulnerability to 
water systems. The author fully understands the sensitivity of addressing vulnerability in 
water and has proceeded in a responsible manner.
Whereas many vulnerability studies identify vulnerable points in the system, most 
are without quantifiable rigor. The author has seen first hand the frustration of military 
leaders who needed a way to quantify vulnerability to water systems to help make better 
force protection decisions. Sousa-Poza (2003) makes the point explicit in his socio- 
technical systems course that decision-makers in general prefer quantification.
Chapter I summarizes the purpose, questions, and significance of the research. 
Limitations and delimitations are presented to establish the context for this inquiry. Key 
concepts and definitions are also presented in Chapter I. Chapter II surveys the literature 
on vulnerability synthesizing definitions, methodologies and key concepts. The literature 
is partitioned into three literature domains: 1) risk, 2) vulnerability, and 3) critical 
infrastructure. The important point made in Chapter II is the gap in the literature with 
respect to quantifying vulnerability to critical infrastructure.
With the research context set and the gap in the literature identified, the 
dissertation focuses Chapter III on the research methodology and design. Chapter III is 
the centerpiece of the dissertation as it discloses the manner in which the research 
purpose is accomplished and the control measures in place to ensure validity. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research methodology explains the manner in which data is linked, collected and 
validated, as well as how data may be aggregated for use in the vulnerability value 
model. Chapter IV is an application o f the model to a water system. The results are 
presented in this chapter. Chapter V documents the contribution of the research to theory 
and practice. In addition, it describes many future concepts and examples of how this 
research may be used in other areas. This chapter provides examples of how the research 
might be used in conjunction with an index score for Homeland Security. The author 
hopes that Chapter V inspires future researchers to develop the ideas presented in this 
chapter. The consolidated references list is an additional benefit for the future researcher 
on vulnerability, infrastructure, and risk.
This research contributes to the body of knowledge in the discipline of risk 
analysis and infrastructure systems. By quantifying vulnerability using the value model 
described in this research, decision-makers will have a meaningful measure of 
vulnerability built upon the decision-makers’ system of values.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Critical infrastructure protection is a very serious mission of the government with 
many civilian and military stake-holders. The customer is ultimately the people. This 
research concentrated on vulnerability to water systems, which is one of six 
infrastructures identified as absolutely critical in the 1998 government report entitled 
Critical Foundations. The report made explicit: 1) telecommunications, 2) energy, 3) 
banking and finance, 4) transportation, 5) water systems and 6) emergency services as 
critical infrastructures.
This research documents the confusion of terms and definitions of terms such as 
vulnerability, risk, hazard, assessment, and analysis. Vulnerability means different 
things to different people and organizations. This gap in the literature concerning 
vulnerability quantification was the motivation for the research questions: (1) What is 
vulnerability as it applies to critical infrastructure systems?, (2) How does risk and 
systems theory apply to critical infrastructure vulnerability?, (3) How can critical 
infrastructure vulnerability be quantified?, and (4) What results from the deployment of a 
systems-based model that quantifies vulnerability to a critical infrastructure such as a 
water system?
Chapter I is organized into six sections. The first section is covers the study 
purpose. It makes the point that systems theory is used to inform the thinking in the 
research design but is not a literature stream in the research. Section two presents the 
research questions that will guide the inquiry. Section three introduces key concepts and 
variables that are germane to the research. Section four describes the research limitations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and delimitations. In essence, this section helps define the scope of the research. Section 
five presents the significance of the research. It shows just how important the research is 
by describing the original and significant contributions of the research. Chapter I 
concludes by summarizing the content of the chapter.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to develop and deploy a systems-based model that 
quantifies vulnerability to critical infrastructure. Develop and deploy implies that a 
model was created and then applied to an existing infrastructure. The model is systems- 
based in its design because critical infrastructures are large-scale complex systems. 
Systems-based implies that systems theory was used to inform the vulnerability model 
development. However, systems theory as a body of literature is not being surveyed as a 
stream in the literature review. Instead, systems theory was used to support the 
perspective taken for model development. Furthermore, critical infrastructures are richly 
interconnected with society. Therefore, appreciation and understanding of the nature and 
relationships of the components, entities, and boundaries along with other system 
properties was critical to the research. Systems theory helps to understand the system in 
focus so that meaningful vulnerability quantification can be accomplished. To 
accomplish the study purpose, the research was guided by the research questions 
presented in the following section.
Research Questions
Figure one shows the framework inquiry for the study. There were two primary
objectives guiding the research. The objectives were divided into two categories: develop 
and deploy. Under develop there were three questions. The first question was what is 
vulnerability as it applies to critical infrastructure systems? Based upon the literature
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
review the research developed the concept and definition of vulnerability as a key first 
step in exploration of the phenomenon. The research synthesized the known 
vulnerability literature as well as supplementing and complementing it with perspectives 
drawn from systems theory and the discipline of risk analysis. Response to the first 
research question clearly establishes the perspective, definition, and foundation of 
vulnerability necessary to deepen further exploration of the questions related to the 
phenomenon.
The second research question is how does risk and systems theory apply to critical 
infrastructure vulnerability? This study demonstrated and made explicit the utility of 
systems theory in modeling vulnerability as well as its relationship to risk. The 
relationship to risk was guided by the risk literature of Kaplan (1997); Kaplan, Zlotin, 
Zussman, and Vishnipolski (1999); and Kaplan, Haimes, and Garrick (2001).
The third research question is how can critical infrastructure vulnerability be 
quantified? Quantifying vulnerability was built upon the research of Keeney, R.L. 
(1992); Keeney, R.L. and Raiffa, H. (1993); and Parnell, G.S., Jackson, J.A., Jones, B.L., 
Lehmkuhl, L.J., Conley, H.W., and Andrew, J.M., (1998). Model decomposition is 
inspired by systems theory, guided by the research of Sage and Armstrong (2000), 
Haimes (1998) and Gibson (1991).
Deploy has one supporting question: what results from the deployment of a systems- 
based model that quantifies vulnerability to a critical infrastructure such as a water 
system? After applying the model to an infrastructure as a case application, the 
usefulness of the model is measured. The application of the model provides for a critical 
examination of the ability of the model to be employed in establishing vulnerability of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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critical infrastructure. Although this model deployment is limited, it does serve as an 




Deploy the model 
to a critical 
infrastructure.
What is vulnerability 
as it applies to 
critical infrastructure 
system s?




Develop a system s- 
based model that 
quantifies vulnerability 
to critical infrastructure.
How does risk and 
system s theory 
apply to critical 
infrastructure 
vulnerability?
Develop and deploy 
a system s-based  
model that quantifies 
vulnerability to critical 
infrastructure.
What results from 
the deployment of a 
system s-based  
model that quantifies 
vulnerability to a 
critical infrastructure 
such as a water 
system ?
Figure 1. Framework for Inquiry
Definition of Key Concepts and Variables
While many definitions of infrastructure are explored in Chapter II, this research
was guided by the definition provided in the Presidential Decision Directive 63 (p. 1, 
1998) as “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of 
the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, 
energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
governmental and private”. Of these six critical infrastructures the scope of this research 
focuses exclusively on water systems.
In a similar fashion, vulnerability is defined in many different ways and those 
definitions are explored in Chapter II. For the purpose of this research, critical 
infrastructure vulnerability was defined as a measure of the susceptibility of critical 
infrastructure to threat scenarios. Furthermore, this research asserts that critical 
infrastructure vulnerability is a function of threat scenario, protection, and importance. 
Threat scenarios are guided by the research of Kaplan (1997); Kaplan, Zlotin, Zussman, 
and Vishnipolski (1999); and Kaplan, Haimes, and Garrick (2001). Vulnerability is 
measured by a system’s deterrence, detection, delay and response capabilities.
Importance implies that some subsystems are more critical to overall system performance 
than other subsystems.
A key concept o f this research is the relationship between risk and vulnerability. 
Exploring this concept became apparent due to the confusion of terms in the academic 
literature. This research asserts that the threat scenario is the link between risk and 
vulnerability. Chapter III describes these relationships in detail. Kaplan’s (1997) 
foundational paper on the quantitative definition of risk defines a risk triplet (scenario, 
likelihood, consequence) and his work guided the development of the vulnerability 
triplet: threat scenario, protection, and importance.
Omega (Q) is the output variable o f interest in this research. Omega (G) is the 
vulnerability value Calculated by the vulnerability value model described in Chapter III. 
Model parameters are variables that are assigned by subject-matter experts: threat 
scenarios (s), protection (p), and importance (w).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Study Limitations and Delimitations
The major limitation of this research is that it addresses one critical infrastructure,
water supply. Therefore, extension of this research beyond water systems to other critical 
infrastructures cannot be directly established from the research. Another limitation to 
this research is that it focuses on a medium sized clean water system. In addition, the 
generalizability of research findings beyond a water supply system must be questioned 
because the study was not based on a large population (Palmquist 2003; Creswell 1994). 
This implies that if a fixture researcher attempts to generalize the results of this research 
beyond the original context, the research findings may have questionable applicability. 
The implication of this limitation suggests that this research will not show 
generalizability beyond the chosen critical infrastructure of water supply. The 
transferability o f the research methodology, methods, and model is an important aspect of 
this study, but cannot be directly established beyond applicability to contextually similar 
water systems. The value model developed for this research represents the values of the 
subject-matter expert who assigned the weights and shape of value functions. Great care 
was taken in validating the parameter settings for the model, to account for subject-matter 
expert values expressed in the model. The qualifications of subject matter experts were 
rigorously established for this research to minimize the impact of this limitation.
This research did not apply the model to every type of infrastructure. Instead, the 
research confines itself to one water supply case study and known decomposition 
supported by the literature (American Water Works Association 2002). The research 
does not present a new methodology. In addition, the research does not address the 
interaction between the infrastructures but acknowledges interaction exists (figure 2). In
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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addition, the model does not address interdependencies within the structure or between
infrastructures.
3.0 4.0 5.0
2.0 Emergency Banking & Telecommun 6.0






Figure 2. Interaction Matrix among Critical 
Infrastructures
Although threat scenarios are shown to be the link between risk and vulnerability, this 
research does not inject threat scenarios into quantifying vulnerability. This was deemed 
beyond the scope of this research and not required to quantify vulnerability of a clean 
water system. A rich discussion on how future researchers might accomplish this is 
presented in Chapter VI.
In summary, this section presented the limitations and delimitations in the 
research. The limitations and delimitations have been considered, were reasonable, and 
did not affect the ability to respond to the research questions.
Significance of the Study
Quantifying vulnerability to clean water systems is a significant contribution because 
the US alone has 54,000 systems providing water to 263 million customers (American 
Water Works Association (AWWA) 2002). This research contributed to the body of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
knowledge by reviewing and then synthesizing the limited literature on vulnerability. 
Contributions were organized into two domains: academic and practical (DOD, 
governments, and private industries). Academic contributions include a systems-based 
vulnerability model that quantifies vulnerability for a critical infrastructure, new theory of 
vulnerability, and the relationship of risk and vulnerability made explicit. This is 
significant because up to this point, no one has quantified vulnerability. This research 
fills that gap using the value model as the construct for quantifying vulnerability, 
discussed in chapter III as the Omega Value. This research shows how one can assess the 
system and measure its performance compared to the ideal system Omega value of 
vulnerability. Practical implications of the research include providing decision-makers 
with a model to help them understand system vulnerability so that resources can be 
allocated in a meaningful way. The Omega value of vulnerability accomplishes this need 
because as the user makes changes, the model can be ran multiple iterations to see first 
hand how vulnerability may be reduced. Practitioners will be provided with the model 
and the references that allow them to conduct their own analysis.
Summary
Chapter I identified the framework and the supporting research questions: 1) what 
is vulnerability as it applies to critical infrastructure systems?; 2) how does risk and 
systems theory apply to critical infrastructure vulnerability?; and 3) how can critical 
infrastructure vulnerability be quantified? Next, the significance of the research was 
identified by the fact that quantifying vulnerability in a rigorous manner was missing 
from the literature. Limitations and delimitations were presented that narrowed the scope 
to water systems. In addition, chapter I outlines the content and flow of the dissertation. 
Chapter I makes explicit the relationship between risk and vulnerability. Chapter I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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concluded by detailing the novel contributions of theory and vulnerability quantification 
and summarizing the chapter. In the following chapter, the literature review is presented.




The purpose of this chapter is to review, synthesize, and criticize the literature 
that describes what is known regarding vulnerability. The first section explores the many 
definitions and conceptual idea and definitions on vulnerability, vulnerability assessment, 
and quantification of vulnerability. Section two provides a brief overview of critical 
infrastructure and a working definition of critical infrastructure. Section three describes 
classic risk analysis and the manner in which the term vulnerability is viewed. Section 
four discusses the use of systems theory in the representation of critical infrastructure 
using foundational concepts to guide the construction of a critical infrastructure from a 
systems point of view. The final section summarizes the chapter, and the significance of 
the literature review.
Building a model to quantify critical infrastructure vulnerability involves the 
literature domains of risk, infrastructure, systems, and decision science. Chapter II 
systematically navigates through the literature streams of vulnerability and critical 
infrastructure to understand the current state of knowledge for vulnerability. The 
discipline of quantitative risk analysis is explored to understand the literature concerning 
the relationship between risk and vulnerability. This is important because literature 
review of infrastructure indicates significant differences in the definition of vulnerability. 
Systems, decision sciences, and risk literature are used in Chapter III to support model 
construction. Using expert elicitation and aggregation involves the decision sciences 
(Chytka 2003). Value models in their design and deployment are also a part of the 
decision science and systems literature. Chapter III uses decision sciences, risk, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
systems literature in the construction of the vulnerability value model. Government 
literature is also important because most of what is actionable in the study of 
vulnerability is in the government literature. As indicated in Figure 3, no significant 
research has been published on quantifying vulnerability. Also, the risk literature 
provides no research on the operational definition of vulnerability. Although critical 
infrastructure literature describes studies on infrastructures, this literature is silent when it 
comes to quantifying vulnerability. The current literature is poised to fill the gap (as 
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Figure 3. Streams of Literature
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Vulnerability Definitions, Concepts and Assessments
Literature review indicates many views on vulnerability. There is significant 
confusion in the use and meaning of terms such as vulnerability, risk, hazard, assessment, 
and analysis. Buckel (2000) contends that work must be done to clear up the definition 
of vulnerability with respect to risk. For example, Emergency Management Australia 
(1998) defines vulnerability as the degree of susceptibility and resilience of the 
community and environment to hazards. Likewise, the Emergency Management 
Australia (1998) glossary of terms interchanges the terms vulnerability analysis with 
hazard analysis or vulnerability assessment. NWRA (2002) defines a vulnerability 
assessment as the identification of weaknesses in security, focusing on defined threats 
that could compromise its ability to provide a service. Blaike et al. (p. 4,1994) defines 
vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”. The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2002) views vulnerability as 
“susceptibility of resources to negative impacts from hazard events”. Nilsson et al. 
(2001) contend that vulnerability is the collective result of risks and the ability of a 
society, local municipal authority, company or organization to deal with and survive 
external and internal emergency situations. Gheorghe (2001) defines vulnerability as the 
susceptibility and resilience/survivability of the community I system and its environment 
to hazards. Vulnerability is a function of susceptibility, resilience and the environment. 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2002) defines vulnerability to disasters is 
“a status resulting from human action. It describes the degree to which a society is either 
threatened by or protected from the impact of natural hazards”. NSTAC- National
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (1997) is credited for claiming that 
vulnerability is really a function of access and exposure, whereas dictionary.com (2000) 
views vulnerability as susceptibility to attack.
Other uses of vulnerability can be found in the literature. The National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) (1997) presents a view stating that 
vulnerability may be viewed as access and exposure. Nilsson, Magnusson, Hallin, and 
Lenntorp (2000) investigate and present methods suitable for analyzing and auditing 
municipal vulnerability. Nilsson, Magnusson, Hallin, and Lenntorp (2000) propose 
models by which it may be possible to distribute financial support to municipalities for 
their work on reducing vulnerability in the most cost-effective way. Vulnerability exists 
as a result of a collection of risks and the ability of a society, local municipal authority, 
company or organization to deal with and survive external and internal emergency 
situations. In both definitions and uses above, vulnerability is not anchored to any 
literature. In the following paragraph, references are found in the literature that begin to 
measure vulnerability or at a minimum, suggest a scale or direction of attainment. 
Buckle (2000) says that vulnerability is a broad measure of the susceptibility to suffer 
loss or damage. The higher the resilience, the less likely damage may be, and the faster 
and more effective recovery is likely to be. Conversely, the higher the vulnerability, the 
more exposure there is to loss and damage. Andreas, Wenger and Dunn (2002) 
developed a handbook compiling risk analysis strategies used by eight countries for 
critical infrastructure protection. Organizations such as Association of State Drinking 
Water Administrators National Rural Water Association (2002) have developed self- 
assessment vulnerability checklists as well as American Water Works Association
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(AWWA). In a similar fashion, academic literature and government reports address 
vulnerability as a step in risk assessment.
Sandia National Laboratories presents a high-level discussion on water system 
vulnerability for local, state and federal risk practitioners. However, Sandia National 
Laboratory has not shared its vulnerability assessment methodology to date. Hierarchical 
Holographic Modeling (Haimes 1981) was used to identify sources of risk and indirectly 
imply systems vulnerabilities (Ezell, Haimes and Lambert 2000). The Infrastructure Risk 
Analysis Model (IRAM) introduced by Ezell, Farr, and Wiese (2000a) mathematically 
modeled vulnerability as simply a function of access and exposure, building upon 
NSTAC’s (1997) ideas of access and exposure. For instance, in water systems, exposure 
was equivalent to visibility. Water towers, treatment plants, and pump stations are 
examples of highly visible components. There have been few attempts to address 
vulnerability either by defining or developing checklists within the context of its use. 
Ezell, Farr, and Wiese (2000a) introduce the Infrastructure Risk Analysis Model and 
apply it in a companion paper to a small community’s water supply system. It is the first 
documented attempt in the literature to quantify vulnerability. The focus of this research 
centered on systems decomposition to facilitate subjectively rank ordering vulnerability 
based on exposure and access control. For example, a water system may be described in 
terms of components, elements, modes, or human interactions that satisfy an array of 
functions such as gather, transmit, and deliver. Within the current context of IRAM a 
system is decomposed into components and subjective ad hoc decisions are made 
concerning what sources vulnerabilities to model (Ezell 2000a). Vulnerabilities are a 
function of access a, and exposure yi where vulnerability of a component or subsystem
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is defined as v, = a iy j , where a i and y, are subjectively scaled 0 < a i < land 0 < y, < 1.
A low vulnerability score for a component is an advantage. The total vulnerability of the 
system is a simple summation of all systems vulnerability scores. The total vulnerability
n
of the system is V -  v , . This expression, however, fails to account for the various
i= i
differences in system size, complexity, and number of components. It does not include 
many other factors such as people or context. The system boundary for the IRAM model 
omits many items that touch the system. Also, IRAM does not address the relative 
differences between systems. For instance, any large system’s vulnerability score will 
always be larger than a smaller system due to the number of components. Additionally, 
there exist issues with the boundary of critical infrastructure if  the boundary simply lies 
around components from the perspective of access and exposure. With the exception of 
IRAM, no paper quantifies vulnerability and yet IRAM fails to consider many attributes 
available in the literature.
In conclusion, IRAM inability to account for relative scores from an idealized 
score or assessments between systems seriously diminishes it contribution to quantify 
vulnerability in a manner that can be useful beyond the system it was applied to. And, 
given that there is no upper bound on score, prevents the user from comparing scores 
between systems of different sizes and complexities.
The definitions given in the literature addressing vulnerability appear to fall into 
one category: nominal. Babble (2001) distinguishes three types of definitions: real, 
nominal, and operational. “Real” definitions are difficult because one tries to develop a 
concrete statement that captures the essential and pure elements and attributes of 
something real. For many, an attempt to view an abstraction as if  it had material
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existence is unattainable. Therefore, concepts in scientific inquiry rely upon nominal and 
operational definitions. The literature does not support the conclusion that an 
operational definition of vulnerability exists and therefore it is presently [unjmeasurable. 
The problem with nominal definitions as Babbie (2001) explains is that the definition is 
one that is assigned to a term without any claim that the definition represents a real entity. 
Simply put, nominal definitions are arbitrary. Definitions of vulnerability in the 
literature review appear to fall in the nominal category. Operational definitions are 
nominal and not real. Yet, operational definitions achieve clarity about the meaning of 
the concept and in the context of a given study (Babbie 2001). It is important to note that 
the various definitions of vulnerability presented in this chapter do not share the same 
underlying context. Each definition has been tailored for a particular concept in mind 
and within a certain context. Table 1 below summarizes the definitions from the 
literature review.
Table 1. Summary of Vulnerability Definitions
Author Vulnerability Definition and U ses in the 
Literature
Blaike et al. (1994) A characteristics of a person or group in terms of 
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard
Association of State Drinking 
Water Administrators National 
Rural Water Association (2002)
Developed self-assessment vulnerability 
checklists as well as American Water Works 
Association (AWWA)
Buckle (2000) A broad measure of the susceptibility to suffer 
loss or damage. The higher the resilience, the 
less likely damage may be, and the faster and 
more effective recovery is likely to be. Conversely, 
the higher the vulnerability, the more exposure 
there is to loss and damage
Dictionary.com (2000) susceptibility to attack
Emergency Management 
Australia (1998)
The degree of susceptibility and resilience of the 
community and environment to hazards.
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Author Vulnerability Definition and U ses in the 
Literature
Gheorghe (2001) The susceptibility and resilience/survivability of 
the community / system and its environment to 
hazards. Vulnerability is a function of 
susceptibility, resilience and the environment.
International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (2002)
A status resulting from human action. It describes 
the degree to which a society is either threatened 
by or protected from the impact of natural 
hazards.
National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 
(2002)
Susceptibility of resources to negative impacts 
from hazard events.
Nilsson et al. (2001) The collective result of risks and the ability of a 
society, local municipal authority, company or 
organization to deal with and survive external and 
internal emergency situations.
Nilsson, Magnusson, Hallin, 
and Lenntorp (2000)
Vulnerability exists as a result of a collection of 
risks and the ability of a society, local municipal 
authority, company or organization to deal with 





A function of access and exposure. NSTAC 
(1997) argues that vulnerable systems are 
systems that are exposed and, accessible and 
therefore susceptible to natural hazards as well as 
willful intrusion, tampering, or terrorism.
National Waterworks of Rural 
America (2002)
Vulnerability assessment is the identification of 
weaknesses in security, focusing on defined 
threats that could compromise its ability to provide 
a service.
Ezell et al. (2000) The Infrastructure Risk Analysis Model (IRAM) 
mathematically modeled vulnerability as a function 
of access and exposure, building upon NSTAC’s 
(1997) ideas of access and exposure.
Seven references: Buckle (2000), Dictionary.com (2000), Emergency 
Management of Australia (1998), Gheorghe (2001), International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (2002), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2002), and the 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (1997) use the adjective 
“susceptibility to. . to define vulnerability. Four references: Blaike et al. (1994),
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Nilsson et al. (2001), Nilsson, Magnusson, Hallin, and Lenntorp (2000), and the National 
Waterworks for Rural America (2002) use the adjectives cope and deal with to define 
vulnerability. Two definitions provided by Nilsson et al. (2001) and Nilsson,
Magnusson, Hallin, and Lenntorp (2000) view vulnerability as a collection of risks. Ezell 
et al (2000a) builds upon NSTAC (1997) notion of access and exposure and identify that 
some subsystems and components are not equally important. Subsystems and 
components can be assessed by their relative importance and protected. The literature on 
vulnerability does not support the notion that definitions build upon one another. But 
from what is in the literature a theme begins to emerge in the attributes that describe 
vulnerability: susceptibility to “what”; weakness in the system; a target with respect to a 
threat or risk; exposure to hazard. These concepts are more completely defined in the 
risk literature presented in the following section.
Classic Risk Assessment and the Concept of Vulnerability
Risk assessment methodologies are often employed to help understand what can 
go wrong, estimate the likelihood and the consequences, and to develop risk mitigation 
strategies to counter risk. One critical component of risk assessment methodology is 
determining the vulnerability of a system (Ezell et al. 2000a, 200b). Blaike (1994), 
Buckle (200a,b), NOAA(2002) indicate a link the concept of vulnerability and risk. 
However, foundational definitions such as Lowrance’s (1976), defines risk as a measure 
o f the probability and severity of adverse effects whereas Blaike (1994), Buckle (2000a, 
2000b), NOAA (2002) suggests vulnerability is susceptibility to risk. Kaplan (1997) said 
that risk was a triplet of scenario, likelihood, and consequences. The difference between 
Lowrance (1976) and Kaplan (1997) is the notion of scenario(s) as a euphemism for
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“what can go wrong”. NSTAC (1997) argues that vulnerable systems are systems that 
are exposed and, accessible and therefore susceptible (NOAA 2002) to natural hazards as 
well as willful intrusion, tampering, or terrorism. Therefore, a relationship emerges from 
the literature between vulnerability and risk. Vulnerability highlights the notion of 
susceptibility to a scenario whereas risk focuses on the severity of consequences to a 
scenario. The following paragraph discusses scenarios and Chapter III formalizes the 
relationship between vulnerability and risk.
Scenario appears in risk and vulnerability literature. A scenario is defined as an 
outline, script, or sequence of events (dictionary.com, 2003). In the discipline of risk 
analysis, scenarios were made explicit by Kaplan and Garrick (1981); Kaplan, Zlotin, 
and Vishnipolski (1999); and refined by Kaplan, Haimes and Garrick (2001). 
Fundamental to the theory of scenario structuring is the requirement that scenarios be (1) 
complete, (2) finite, and (3) disjoint. In Kaplan and Garrick (1981) the authors point out 
that scenario was loosely defined as “What can go wrong?” In Kaplan, Haimes and 
Garrick (2001) the authors attempt to bridge Hierarchical Hologrpahic Modeling (HHM) 
Haimes (1981) with the theory of uncertainty. The approach focuses on using the 
philosophy of HHM to holistically identify sources of risk from multiple perspectives: 
functional, temporal, and geographical. The authors then introduce rate and weight 
methodologies to arrive at a subset of scenarios from which to proceed. However, the 
authors do not address how one explicitly defines a scenario, nor the limit of the universal 
set of all risks and scenarios. In fact, even if  one satisfies the criteria above, the essential 
components of the scenario remain an open question in the literature.
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Literature review indicates that vulnerability is not defined explicitly in the risk 
literature, yet there are similar themes of scenario used in risk and vulnerability. 
Vulnerability emphasizes susceptibility to a scenario and risk highlights the severity of 
consequences to a scenario. The literature also highlights that certain subsystems and 
components are relatively more important to other components and subsystems 
performance of its overall purpose. Last, the literature shows that these susceptible 
components and subsystems need protection from threat scenarios. In the following 
section, the infrastructure literature is reviewed to understand what is meant by critical 
infrastructure with an emphasis on water systems.
Critical Infrastructure
Military and civilian leaders (i.e. decision makers) have the responsibility to
protect our Nation’s critical infrastructure, communities, and symbols of American power 
from terrorists, home and abroad, as well as from natural disasters. For the purpose of 
this research critical infrastructure is defined as “those physical and cyber-based systems 
essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but 
are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, 
water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private” (FDD 63, p. 1, 
1998).
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Figure 4. Extensive Size of US Water System
This research focuses on the water system as a critical infrastructure. To 
understand the magnitude of this critical infrastructure, consider the number of utilities 
and customers per infrastructure sector. There are 54,064 clean water systems in the 
United States, serving 264 million Americans (GDI 2002). Figure 4 provides a sense of 
the scope of water systems as an extraordinarily large critical infrastructure. A water 
system can be decomposed into two distinct systems, clean water and sanitary sewer 
systems. A clean water system has seven main functions in the process flow (AWWA 
2002b): 1) water arrives from a source; 2) pumped from a well, river, etc. to a treatment 
plant; 3) treatment plant removes impurities; 4) clean water is stored in tank; 5)
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distribution mains carry clean water to industry and service lines; 6) service lines cany 
water to homes; and 7) from industry and homes, water enters the sanitary sewer system. 
The sanitary sewer system sewer lines carry water to a sewage treatment plant. After 
cleansing, water is returned to the source such as river where the Earth continues the 
cleansing process (AWWA 2002b). In conclusion, Figure 5 and the section above 










Figure 5. Function Flow Diagram of Water 
System
Table 2 summarizes the functions of a water system and a brief description of 
each function (AWWA 2002b and Reynolds 2004). These functions become important 
in Chapter III, as the decomposition readily identified and understood in the literature in 
used in the research design in Chapter III. Table 3 is a matrix of literature that 
summarizes the contributions of authors and the subject which each author addressed. 
Along the left column of the table research questions are listed. Along the top of the 
matrix, authors are listed. Within the body of the matrix, an “X” indicates that the 
author’s research and that characteristic/element addressed in their work. An “X” under 
Ezell (2004) indicates the areas in which this research supplemented and complimented 
the body o f scholarly research. In the case research has not been previously conducted, 
this research fills the following gaps: 1) vulnerability is defined explicitly; 2) the 
application to critical infrastructure is shown; 3) vulnerability is quantified; 4) a theory of
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vulnerability is presented; 5) the relationship between vulnerability and risk is made 
explicit; and 6) an application of the model’s ability to quantify vulnerability to a critical 
infrastructure is presented.
Table 2. System Functions
Number Name description
1.1 Clean Water System Source, Transmission, Treatment, Storage, Distribution, Use, Communication, and Control
1.1.1 Source water
Watersheds and surface water sources, Reservoirs 
and dams, Groundwater sources, Wells and 
galleries
1.1.2 Transmission system
Intake structures, Aqueducts, Pump stations, 
Pipelines, Valves
1.1.3 Treatment facilities
Facility structures (buildings, basins, and tanks), 
Controls (manual and computer), Equipment 
(feeder, pumps, and piping), Treatment chemicals 
and storage
1.1.4 Finished water storage Clearwells, Tanks, Elevated tanks, and Reservoirs
1.1.5 Distribution system
Pipelines, valves, fire hydrants; Pump or pressure- 
reducing stations; Materials (extra pipe, valves, 
hydrants, etc.); Meters, meter boxes, and pits; 
Cross-connection-control and backflow-prevention 
devices
1.1.6 Use Home, Industry
1.1.7 Communications Telephone, Radio, Internet/intranet
1.1.8 Control SCADA or Telemetry
Summary
This chapter has shown the gap in the literature on vulnerability defined 
operationally (Babbie 2001) and the lack of any model to quantify vulnerability. In 
addition, the literature shows the significance of critical infrastructure and the massive 
size of just one infrastructure: water supply. Although there have been attempts to 
quantify vulnerability, they have not been as robust or rigorous in their formulation as 
this research. Ezell and Farr (2000a, 2000b) attempted to quantify vulnerability, yet the 
approach omits many of the attributes of vulnerability pointed out by NSTAC (1997),
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NOAA (2002), Baike (1994) and Buckle (200a,b). Kaplan (1997), Kaplan and Garrick 
(1981); Kaplan, Zlotin, and Vishnipolski (1999) and Kaplan, Haimes and Garrick 
(2001) research on the quantitative definition of risk and specifically the notion of 
scenario is very significant to this research because scenario is identified in Chapter III as 
the link between risk and vulnerability. For die remainder of this dissertation, critical 
infrastructure vulnerability is defined as the susceptibility of the infrastructure to threat 
scenarios. This research filled the gap in the vulnerability literature. Specifically, this 
research defined and quantified vulnerability with a systems perspective and in a manner 
that can was modeled and measured. Second, the vulnerability model was applied to a 
critical infrastructure (clean water system). Third, vulnerability theory was induced from 
the literature that made explicit the relationship between risk and vulnerability. In 
Chapter III, the research methodology is presented. It provides the research design and 
manner that data will be collected, analyzed and interpreted.
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The purpose of this chapter is to detail the research methodology and design. The 
chapter is comprised of six sections. The first section is the research design. It explains 
the form of the design and how the author arrived at the type of research. The chapter 
transitions to expert elicitation in the second section and how experts were used in the 
design. In this section, the details for how experts’ assessments are combined to facilitate 
data for the modeling of vulnerability are explained. In the third section of the chapter, 
the relationship between risk and vulnerability is disclosed. The threat scenario is shown 
to be the relationship and the link between risk and vulnerability. The fourth section 
describes the construction of the vulnerability value model. The components of the 
construction and value functions are discussed. In addition, the section describes how the 
model calculates vulnerability. In the final section, model calibration, verification and 
validation are explained.
This research was not exclusively qualitative. For research question number three 
(How can critical infrastructure vulnerability be quantified?) it was determined that a 
quantitative approach was more appropriate to answer this question, based on the analysis 
in Table 4 below. Also, qualitative designs are more focused on process (Creswell, 1994) 
and in this research, the outcome of the model was more important as identified as a gap 
in the literature from Chapter II. The design explained further in the chapter dictated 
quantification. Sensitivity analysis was required to understand parameter and model
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sensitivity. In addition, aggregation of subject-matter experts scoring required 
quantification because many of the scores were o f the form consistent with the work of 
Chytka (2003): pessimistic, most likely, and optimistic; and modeled using the triangle 
distribution. Qualitative research methodology was used in the inductive process of 
developing a model for vulnerability and a critical step in the development of a theory of 
critical infrastructure vulnerability.
Chapter III describes the mixed research methodology that was used during this 
research. As the methodology is explained, literature was used to support the design 
decisions that were made concerning the details of the approach. The entire research 
design is outlined in Figure 6. The research design explains the research approach that 
guided the inquiry. It includes concepts and details and required steps in the execution of 
the research. Creswell (p. 146,1994) maintains that “one of the chief reasons for 
conducting a qualitative study is that the study is exploratory; not much has been written 
about the topic or population being studied, and the researcher seeks to listen to 
informants and to build a picture based on their ideas”. In the pursuit of defining critical 
infrastructure vulnerability, it became obvious that exploration was needed. Leedy and 
Ormrod (2001) provided guideline questions about research and then two columns for 
quantitative and qualitative approach, Table 4. The author’s analysis is indicated by an 
asterisk (*) and the mix of qualitative and quantitative becomes apparent for this 
research. Although Creswell (1994) advises that one should avoid a mixed approach, 
Rogers (2002) maintains that one should allow the problem type to drive the approach. 
The first question: “what is the purpose of the research?” the literature was used 
qualitatively to describe and explain vulnerability’s definition and relationship to risk.
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Although a complete theory of vulnerability was not accomplished, the literature and 
model development discussed later in the chapter begins to infer a theory to build upon in 
future research. The second question “what is the nature of the research?” the literature 
combined with the author’s systems engineering and risk analysis background concluded 
that the research was holistic, included context, and held personal view due in large part 
to research conducted in Ezell et al. (2000a, 2000b). The third question from Table 4 was 
“what are the methods of data collection?” Given that most of what is known on 
vulnerability as indicated in Chapter II was in the literature, observations and interviews 
became apparent to further understand vulnerability. The form of reasoning was both 
inductive to build the relationship of vulnerability and risk, as well as the definition and 
model of vulnerability, whereas the output from the model was studied by deductive 
analysis. Finally, the findings were communicated in two ways, through interviews and 
literature as well as the quantified output from the model. For these reasons, a mixed 
approach was necessary and appropriate.
Table 4. Determining Research Approach (Leedy
and Ormrod 2001)
Question Quantitative Qualitative
What is the purpose of the 
research?
• To explain and predict
• To confirm and validate
• To test theory
• To describe and explain*
• To explore and interpret
• To build theory*














What are the methods of data 
collection?
• Representative, large 
sample
• Standardized instruments
•  Informative, small 
sample*
• Observations, interviews*
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Ouestion Quantitative Qualitative
What is the form of reasoning 
in the analysis?
• Deductive analysis* • Inductive Analysis*
How are the findings 
communicated?
• Numbers*
•  Statistics, aggregated 
data*
• Formal voice, scientific 
style
• Words*
• Narratives, individual 
quotes*
• Personal style, literary 
style
Research Design
This research focused on using the literature to qualitatively infer the definition of 
vulnerability, then transitioned to quantifying vulnerability to a clean water system. This 
research design was type one holistic, single case design (Yin 1984) where the unit of 
analysis was one medium-sized clean water system. The research design was holistic in 
that it considered an entire water system. The research was a single case in that it 
focused on one application to a clean water system to demonstrate the model’s ability to 
quantify vulnerability. To achieve this design, critical infrastructure vulnerability was 
defined in an operational way as described in the previous section.
In the following sections of chapter III, interview and survey instruments, data 
collection and analysis plan, and interpretation are described. The research design used 
the literature as the basis for choices made. The following sections identify expert 
criteria used and the manner in which subject-matter experts are employed in the 
research. Critical infrastructure vulnerability is defined showing that the conceptual and 
mathematical relationship of vulnerability and risk is the threat scenario. The final 
section in this chapter details the barriers to the research and what was done to mitigate 
those barriers. Each step in the design is shown in Figure 6 and described in each 
corresponding section.
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Figure 6. Research Design
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Expert Elicitation
Validating model construction, setting the parameters of the model and scoring 
the performance of the clean water system with respect to each threat scenario required 
the use o f experts. The criteria used for selecting experts are guided by the research of 
Chytka (2003): 1) years o f experience in water systems as an engineer, manager, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) design; 2) educational 
background in engineering (civil, environmental, chemical); and 3) appropriate expertise 
for discipline specific tasks such as water storage, treatment, distribution, and control.
This research included three subject-matter experts (SME). SME-1 was 
interviewed to validate the decomposition of the system into functions. The interview 
worksheet is located in Appendix B. SME-2 was asked to establish the relative 
importance of each o f the components of the decomposed system shown below in Figure 
9. The Microsoft Excel ® (Microsoft Corporation, 2004, Version 2003 SR-2) workbook 
used to collect the data is located in Appendix C. SME-2 was asked to establish the 
shape of the value functions in the model. The Microsoft Excel workbook used to collect 
the data is located in Appendix D. SMEs-1 and 2 were next interviewed to assess the 
vulnerability a notional clean water medium-sized system. SME-3 was used to weight 
the assessments of SME-1 and 2. SME-3 was exceptionally qualified as his experience 
was 28 years (1.5 to 2 times greater than SME-1 and 2) in the clean water treatment and 
production system. In addition, his education was equal to both SME-1 and 2. In 
addition, SME 1,2,and 3 were each asked to gage the face validity o f the final model as 
discussed in Appendix F. (Chykta, p. 50,2003) states in her research: “the linear opinion
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pool Is the most straightforward method of combining the opinions of experts”. Chytka 
(2003) points out that for the cases where hard data is negligible or non existent, one 
must rely upon subject matter experts to quantify uncertainty, making mathematical 
aggregation such as the linear opinion pool appropriate choice to mathematically 
aggregate uncertainty scores among subject matter experts. This research utilized the 
aggregation methodology and process model of Chytka (p. 45,2003):
1. Who is doing the aggregation: a normative model, a decision-maker or a 
group?
2. What is the form of the information elicited and the response the decision­
maker generates?
3. What is the nature of events that are relevant to aggregation epistemically 
uncertain or aleatory?
4. Are there any inherent characterizations that can be made about the 
information pattern or information sources such as biases or redundancy in 
information?
5. What combination rule is to be utilized?
For question one: who is doing the aggregation this research design culminated in 
a model to quantify vulnerability therefore the answer to this question was a normative 
model using Microsoft Excel ® (Microsoft Corporation, 2004, Version 2003 SR-2) and 
the add-in simulation software Crystal Ball ® (Decisioneering 2004, Version 5.0). 
Chytka’s (2003) second question: what is the form of the information elicited and the 
response the decision-maker generates? This research design indicated qualitative using 
semi-structured interviews and then quantified using Chytka (2003) Aggregation Process
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Model. For question three, what is the nature of events that are relevant to aggregation 
epistemically uncertain or aleatory? This research modeled aleatory or uncertain answers 
using the triangle distribution because how an expert scores or assesses a system cannot 
fully be known. Question four asked are there any inherent characterizations that can be 
made about the information pattern or information sources such as biases or redundancy 
in information? Chytka (2003) identifies the research of Conway’s (2003) use of the 
calibration function to account for redundancies in information, but this work is not part 
of the aggregation algorithm itself and is beyond the scope of this research. In question 
five, Chytka (2003) asks: what combination rule is to be utilized? Chykta (2003) presents 
no best or dominant choices and states that there is no clear best answer in the literature 
and that the ultimate choice reverts to the researcher. For this research, the weighted 
linear opinion pool method was chosen. The linear opinion pool was used to combine 
scores when scores were uncertain, using the triangle distribution (Chykta 2003). 
Microsoft Excel ® (Microsoft Corporation, 2004, Version 2003 SR-2) and the add-in 
simulation software Crystal Ball ® (Decisioneering 2004, Version 5.0) was used to 
collect the data. The instructions and scoring table sample is located in Appendix E. 
SME-3(S) was used to determine the weighting factor reflecting the perceived credibility 
for each SME based on expert criteria already mentioned above and comparing each 
SME resume of experience. The assessment is provided in Appendix F. The case 
application, a clean water medium-sized system, was provided from the research of Ezell 
and Farr (2000b).
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The Relationship: Vulnerability and Risk
In Chapter II, the literature review revealed many concepts and definitions on 
vulnerability and risk. The following paragraphs summarize vulnerability, risk and the 
attributes that define and describe each. The first paragraph highlights vulnerability and 
risk. Next, scenarios are shown to be the link between vulnerability and risk. The final 
paragraph of this section describes the mathematical relationship of vulnerability and 
risk.
To recap vulnerability, Buckle (2000), Dictionary.com (2000), Emergency 
Management of Australia (1998), Gheorghe (2001), International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (2002), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2002), and the 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (1997) use the adjective 
“susceptibility to ...” to define vulnerability. Blaike et al. (1994); Nilsson et al. (2001); 
Nilsson, Magnusson, Hallin, and Lenntorp (2000); and the National Waterworks for 
Rural America (2002) use the adjectives “cope and deal with” to define vulnerability. 
Two definitions provided by Nilsson et al. (2001) and Nilsson, Magnusson, Hallin, and 
Lenntorp (2000) view vulnerability as a “collection of risks”, thus establishing a 
relationship between vulnerability and risk in the literature. Careful study of the 
literature disclosed the attributes that describe vulnerability: susceptibility to “what”; 
weakness in the system; a target with respect to a threat or risk; exposure to hazard. 
Kaplan (1997) said that risk was a triplet o f scenario, likelihood, and consequences. The 
difference between Lowrance (1976) and Kaplan (1997) was the notion of scenario(s) as 
a euphemism for “what can go wrong”. Vulnerability highlights the notion o f 
susceptibility to a scenario whereas risk focuses on the severity o f consequences to a
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scenario. Scenario appears in risk literature as an outline, script, or sequence of events. 
In the discipline of risk analysis, scenarios were made explicit by Kaplan and Garrick 
(1981); Kaplan, Zlotin, and Vishnipolski (1999); and refined by Kaplan, Haimes and 
Garrick (2001). Fundamental to the theory o f scenario structuring was the requirement 
that scenarios be (1) complete, (2) finite, and (3) disjoint. Kaplan, Haimes and Garrick 
(2001) used scenario as the initiating event. Ezell (2000) and Ezell and Farr (2000a, 
2000b) use scenario in a similar way with event trees. Scenarios were used in the 
development of alternatives and performance is assessed. In Kaplan and Garrick (1981), 
the authors point out that scenario was loosely defined as: “What can go wrong?” In 
Kaplan, Haimes and Garrick (2001), the authors attempted to bridge Hierarchical 
Hologrpahic Modeling (HHM) Haimes (1981) with the theory of uncertainty. The 
approach focused on using the philosophy of HHM to holistically identify sources of risk 
from multiple perspectives: functional, temporal, and geographical. The authors then 
introduced rate and weight methodologies to arrive at a subset of scenarios from which to 
proceed. However, the authors did not address how one explicitly defines a scenario, nor 
the limit of the universal set of all risks and scenarios. In fact, even if  one satisfied the 
criteria above, the essential components o f the scenario remain an open question in the 
literature. In summary, this research has shown that vulnerability emphasizes 
susceptibility to a scenario (sometimes referred to as threat scenario) and risk highlights 
the severity of consequences to a threat scenario. Whereas risk is a function of threat 
scenario, likelihood of occurrence, and consequence, critical infrastructure vulnerability 
was shown to be a function of threat scenario, protection, and importance. Importance 
implied that some subsystems are more critical to overall system performance than other
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subsystems (Ezell 2000a). Threat scenarios typified the classic risk question: what can 
go wrong? This research used the notion of importance (Ezell 2000a) and AWWA 
(2002b) measures of deterrence, detection, delay and response capabilities and to 
measure protection and quantify system vulnerability.
From the research of Kaplan and Garrick (1981), mathematically risk is (R a) =  
{sa, la, xa}A. In words, risk is the universal set of the triplet: scenario (sa), likelihood (la) 
and (xa) consequence shown below.
Building upon Kaplan and Garrick (1981) definition and the relationship of 
scenario pointed out in Chapter II, vulnerability is the universal set of the triplet: scenario 
(sa), protection (pa), and importance (wa) shown below. Mathematically vulnerability is 
(O a) =  {Sa, Pa, wa}A.
To measure system vulnerability this research assessed protection by measuring 








Figure 8. Universe of Vulnerability, A
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In summary, as developed and inferred from the literature synthesized in Chapter 
II and amplified here in Chapter III, the definition of critical infrastructure vulnerability 
was shown to be the susceptibility of the infrastructure to threat scenarios, where 
vulnerability (Q) is a function of threat (sa), protection (pa), and importance (wa). Threat 
scenario is akin to the risk question: what can go wrong (Kaplan and Garrick 1981)?
This is the relationship between risk and vulnerability. And, vulnerability was quantified 
by a system’s protection measures evaluated as deterrence, detection, delay and response 
capabilities (AWWA 2002b). Chapter IV includes a section that discusses concepts on 
applying threat scenarios for future researches. The following section describes the value 
model as the logical construct for quantifying critical infrastructure vulnerability. 
Vulnerability Value Model Construction
The critical infrastructure clean water system vulnerability value model was built 
upon the mathematics of multi-attribute value theory and structured as a value model.
The research was guided by the work of Keeney, R.L. (1992), Keeney, R.L. and Raiffa,
H. (1993), and Parnell, G.S., Jackson, J.A., Jones, B.L., Lehmkuhl, L.J., Conley, H.W., 
and Andrew, J.M., (1998). Model decomposition was inspired by systems theory and 
guided by the research of Sage and Armstrong (2000), Haimes (1998) and Gibson (1991). 
The model was targeted to a medium-sized clean water system as a large-scale complex 
system (Ezell 2000a). Taken as an entire system, functional decomposition of a clean 
water system was guided by the research of AWWA (2002b) and shown in figure 9. This 
decomposition served as the structure of value model.
The next step in model construction was to add the protection level of evaluation 
measures to the model. For each of the lowest levels of the model, protection measures
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of deterrence (di), detection fa ) ,  delay (d3> and response (r) were added. Deterrence (di) 
was defined by Garcia (2001) as those measures implemented that are perceived by 
adversaries as too difficult to defeat. Detection (d2) was defined as the probability of 
determining that an unauthorized action has occurred or is occurring including sensing, 
communicating alarm to control center, and assessing the alarm. Delay (ds) was defined 
as the time, measured in minutes that an element of a physical protection system designed 
to impede adversary penetration into or exit from the protected area (Garcia 2001). 
Response (r) was defined as time (minutes) to respond to a threat (Garcia 2001). The 
next step in establishing the model was constructing the value functions. This step is 
covered in the next section.
Value Function Construction
The model used four evaluation measures of protection. These measures were 
deterrence (dl), detection (d2), delay (d3), and response (r). The definitions of the 
measures were guided by the research of Garcia (2001), Sandia (2000) and AWWA 
(2002b). Figures 10-13 show four samples representing each of the four protection 
measures. A value function has five components: 1) definition and source, 2) x-axis 
description, 3) function, and 4) the subject-matter expert who determined the relationship 
between the x-axis and the associated value. The rationale behind subject-matter expert 
criteria and selection are presented later in the chapter. To recap, Garcia (2001) defined 
deterrence measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too difficult to 
defeat. In Figure 10, the value function x-axis has a description for each on an ordinal 
scale of one to five. On the V(x) axis, the subject-matter expert decided that for a given 
subsystem, the value he placed on the level of increasing deterrence. Figures 11 through
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13 are samples for detect, delay and response. All 14 sets (56 individually) of the actual 
value functions are listed in Appendix D.
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Deterrence value function X v(x)
None 0 1
Posting signs 1 20
Posting signs and night lighting 2 40
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 80
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 100






0 2 3 S4
Figure 10. Deterrence Value Function Example
Detection value function X v(x)
none 0 0




very high 1 100




i 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1i
Figure 11. Protection Value Function Example
Delay value function X v(x)
No delay 0 0
One minute delay 1 20
Five minute delay 5 40
15 minute delay 15 60
30 minute delay 30 80
60 minutes delay 120 100
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversary





Figure 12. Delay Value Function Example
Response value function X v(x)
Respond within seconds 0 100
Respond within one minute 1 80
Respond within five minute 5 60
Respond within 15 minute 15 40
Respond within thirty minute 45 20
Respond within 60 minutes 90 0
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat
Evaluation measure source Garcia, 2001
10Q
25
15 30 450 60 75 90
Response
Figure 13. Response Value Function Example
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In summary, the figures shown above represented the basic value functions that 
subject matter expert used to determine the shape of each function for every component 
in the system. Each function contained a definition, reference source and a graph that 
showed the subject matter expert where his or her value increased or decreased 
monotonically or both. In the next section the manner in which the model was calibrated 
is discussed in the research design.
Model Calibration
Raw data and weights, represented by the scores and relative importance of 
elements were assigned by subject-matter experts. The critical infrastructure clean water 
system vulnerability value model is an additive preference model in that it assigns value 
to each attribute measurement on a scale 0-100, using value assignment methodology. 
Value functions were built through subject-matter expertise assignment and have the 
following form:
V(x) = Y j wmvm(xm)
m=I
Equation 1. Additive Value Form
where m is the evaluation measure, xm is the level of the mth measure, vm(xm) is the value 
of the value function at level xm, and wm is the product of the weights for each level up 
the hierarchy (Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, and Andrew, 1998).
Subject-matter experts were discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. The 
benefits of a value model are that it avoids arbitrary scaling or aggregation and makes the
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model flexible for a variety of users. Flexibility was apparent because a value model 
allowed the user to rate possible levels of evaluation measures with different scales to one 
scale: value ranging from zero as worst to 100 as the best value. Raw data-to-value score 
was simply a piecewise linear interpolation obtained from the value function. The form 
of the function was monotonically increasing, decreasing, or both. A generic value 
model works in the following way: 1) raw data is entered; 2) value is calculated with 
respect to value functions; and 3) a global weight is applied. The model used a 
sufficiently large number of 15,000 trials of Monte Carlo simulation to aggregate 
uncertainty scores from experts and simulated again within the value model itself. 
Although the research could have calculated the minimum required number based on the 
desired standard error and confidence interval, the research design simply accepted very 
large sampling size because the simulation time was not an issue in this research. This 
accounts for uncertainty in scores used for calculating the distribution of values for 
vulnerability. The triangle distribution is an appropriate distribution to be used for such 
cases (Chytka 2003). The model used Monte Carlo simulation to generate the output for 
vulnerability by generating a sufficiently large number of trials (15,000 trials). Table 5 
provides a summary of the output measures for the vulnerability value model. The 
measures column indicates the lowest level within the model.
Table 5. Value Model Structure
M easure Component Sub system System
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Delay (.2) Facilities (1.3.1)
Detect (.3)

















Deter (.1) Distribute (1.5)
Delay (.2) Pump Station
Detect (.3) (1.5.1)
Respond (.4)
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SCADA (1.6.1) Control (1.6)
In the adjacent columns, component, subsystem and system show the remaining levels 
from lowest to the top of the model. The numbering system also indicates the location in 
the system. For example, 1.1.1 indicates the Rive component, whereas 1.1.1.2 indicates 
the delay measure at the lowest level in the model. Table 6 is table o f outputs and 
calculations from the model. Table 6 was used to collect all data from experts as well as 
the calculations from the Vulnerability Value Model discussed in Chapter V.
Table 6. Vulnerability Value Model Inputs and 
Calculation Matrix
Evaluation
Measure w t x vfx) Comp wt X V(X) Q
Sub-
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Evaluation
Measure wt x V{X) Comp wt V (x)
Sub-
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Evaluation
Measure wt X V(x)






Table 7 below summarizes the variables and parameters used in the Vulnerability Value 
Model. The left most column describes the variable. In the next two columns, 
description and type of notation is provided. In the last column, the form of the variable 
is shown as discrete or continuous.
Table 7. Model variables and parameters
Notation Description Type Form





Value associated with 
x measure, Total value
score
Variable Continuous
Q Vulnerability Variable Expected Value 
(Continuous)
M Location in model Parameter Discrete
W Global Weight Parameter Discrete
L Local Weight Parameter Discrete
D deterrence (di), 
detection (da), delay 
(da) and response (r)
Variable Continuous
N Number of Trials Parameter Discrete
n
Calculations for the model are in the form V(x) = ^ w mvm (xm). For example, to
m= 1
calculate component value and vulnerability for the river component, the weight of each
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protection measure is multiplied by the corresponding value of x from the value functions 
and summed together for the river component.
vu.i(-*i.n) =  * vu.!.i(xu .i.i) +  wia.i.2 * vi.i.n (x i.i.i.2) +
W U .1.3 * Vl . l . o ( JC1 .1 .u )  +  W1.U .4  *
Equation 2. River Component Value (1.1.1)
River component (1.1.1) vulnerability would be the ideal v*or max possible value score, 
v*(x) minus the assessed value score, v(x). The difference becomes river component 
vulnerability: Oq.i.i).
O u ,  =V *l.l.l(x)-V L11(x)
Equation 3. River Component Vulnerability 
(1.1.1)
Subsystem value score is the sum product of all component value scores and their 
associated weight. For the case of the source subsystem (1.1) the value score is given by 
equation 4.
vu (x) = wl u  * vl u (x) + wU 2 * vU 2(x)
Equation 4. Source Subsystem Value (1.1)
Vulnerability of the source (1.1) subsystem is the difference of the ideal or maximum 
possible value score for the subsystem and the assessed value score given in equation 5.
= V * u ( x ) - V , , ( x )
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Equation 5. Source Subsystem Vulnerability (1.1)
Overall system value score is the product sum of all subsystems given in equation 6.
V(X)  = wu  *vu (x) + wl2 * vu (x) + w,3 * V,3(x) + wL4 * vM(x)
Equation 6. Overall Clean Water System Value
Assessment
In the discrete form, overall vulnerability, Q is the max value (100) minus the overall 
assessed value given in equation 6, above. In the continuous form, the expected value of 
vulnerability, E[Q] is given by equation 7 below.
The output from the model simulation is a distribution of vulnerability, Q. The expected 
value of the distribution is the integration from the min to max value as shown in 
equation 7, above.
In summary, this section has provided the details that were used to develop the 
Vulnerability Value Model. The section showed how relative importance among the 
different components and subsystems would be assessed and collected. Value function 
assessment by subject matter experts were discussed as well as examples. Tables were 
presented to demonstrate how data was organized for the model.
0
Equation 7. Expected Value of vulnerability
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Model Sensitivity, Verification and Validation
Model sensitivity was accomplished by evaluating the influence of each 
assumption within the model to the model’s output (Decisioneering 1996). In Crystal 
Ball ® (Decisioneering 2004, Version 5.0), the influence of each assumption was 
accomplished by analyzing each assumption’s contribution to variance and by measuring 
the relative importance of each assumption to the model’s output. A positive coefficient 
indicates that an increase in an assumption is associated with an increase in the model’s 
output. A negative coefficient implies the reverse. The larger the absolute value of the 
coefficient, the stronger the relationship. In addition, the Monte Carlo simulation (more 
random number generation) was run at 15,000 trials and 150,000 trials to observe if  there 
was change in the output. Also, Latin-Hypercube (more even random number sample) 
runs were simulated to observe output at 15,000 and 150,000 trials (Chytka 2003; 
Decisioneering 2004).
Model verification consisted of the logic and math checks in the model. At every
m
level within the model, the sum of the weights must equal one, ^  wm = 1. In addition,
/=i
the value at the component level product sum must equal the value of the product sum at
1.6 1.6.1
the subsystem level, wmv(jcro) = wmv(xm). The assessed value of the system must
(=1.1 i=i.i.i
always be less than or equal to the ideal or max possible score of the system. Finally, the 
x, v(x), w must be greater than or equal to zero. By following the research design for 
sensitivity and verification, it was assured that that the model performed in its intended
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design. Last, sensitivity as it was designed helped to see what places within the model 
had the greatest impact on the model output.
Model validity was accomplished by using the decomposition of a clean water 
system given by the research of AWWA (2000a) and through interviews with SME-2 and 
SME-3. As stated earlier in the chapter, value model validity was assured by the 
research of Keeney, R.L. (1992); Keeney, R.L. and Raiffa, H. (1993); and Parnell, G.S., 
Jackson, J.A., Jones, B.L., Lehmkuhl, L.J., Conley, H.W., and Andrew, J.M., (1998).
This research design rigorously followed the manner in which values models are 
developed as addressed in the preceding sections. For example, the model was 
decomposed into generally agreed to independent components and subsystems and 
validated with the literature of AWWA (2002). To the greatest extent possible, measures 
were used that held no dependence and supported by the literature from Sandia (2000). 
Face validity of the decomposed medium sized clean water system was validated by the 
research of (Ezell 2000a) and AWWA (2002). In the following section, the methodology 
for scoring and the notional system description used by the subject matter experts is 
presented.
Assessing (Scoring) the Clean Water System
SME-1 and SME-2 scored the notional clean water system described 
below using the scoring matrix provided in Appendix E. The deterrence measure 
was discrete and detect, delay and response measures were assessed with 
uncertainty modeled with the triangle distribution following the expert elicitation 
work of Chytka (2003). In the next section, the notional clean water system
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description used by the subject matter experts is introduced below. The system 
served as a case for application of the Vulnerability Value Model.
Notional Medium Clean Water System
The notional city and corresponding water system was an amalgamation of 
previous work from Ezell (1998); Ezell, Farr and Wiese (2000b); and Ezell, Haimes, and 
Lambert (2001). The City was a medium-sized municipality comprised of 10,000 
customers. It has a water treatment and distribution system that supplies approximately 2 
million gallons per day (MGD). The community is mainly residential with some light 
industrial facilities. Water Treatment Plant A (WTPA) is primarily responsible for the 
uninterrupted flow of water to its customers. The primary means of water-flow is 
gravity. WTPA receives water from a large lake that is shared with another small 
community to the south. The treatment processes are relatively simple, involving 
chlorinating (for disinfecting), addition of fluoride (dental health), and treatment with 
alum (clarification). The treatment plant has some simple gauges monitoring inflows and 
outflows, and some fault lights that alert the operator to pump failures. There is no 
sophisticated computer-based control o f the treatment plant. The SCADA system uses a 
master-slave relationship, relying on the total control of the SCADA Master. Remote 
terminal units are dumb. They accept instructions and perform their functions in 
accordance with their programming. The water from the treatment plant is pumped to 
Tank 1 from where it supplies Area A. Area A has approximately 2/3 of the total number 
of customers during the day. WTPB is primarily used during the summer time to 
support the added demand in a seasonal resort area. WTPB also shares a lake with an
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adjacent city, east of the reservation. WTPB has similar treatment processes to WTPA, 
and primarily supplies Area D, although it can also supply Area C. There are 4 tanks and 
1 pumping station as shown in Figure 14. Tank 1 serves 2/3 of customers in the most 
densely populated low-level area (the community is on the side of a mountain valley).
The capacity of Tank 1 is 0.5 MG. The remaining tanks serve relatively fewer customers 
in the high-level zone comprised of Areas B, C, and D.
Pump Station 1 is controlled from the levels in Tank 2, using simple float balls 
and RTU as well as a landline modem connection between the two sites to transmit a 
control signal. The control is based on level control using a pump cut-in level and a pump 
cutout level. The tank capacity has two component segments. One is reserve storage that 
allows the tank to operate over a peak week when demand exceeds pumping capacity. 
The other component is control storage. This is the portion of the tank between the pump 
cutout and cut-in levels. Visually, the control storage is the top portion of the tank. If 
demand is less than pump rate, (low demand periods) the level will rise until it reaches 
the pump cut-out-level. When the water level falls to the tank cut-in-level the pump will 
begin to operate. The cut-in-level refers to a level in the tank that water reaches and 
triggers the pump to start. If the demand is greater than the pump rate, the level will 
continue to fall, until it reaches reserve storage. The tank level will stay in this area until 
the demand has fallen for a sufficient time to allow the level to recover. The reserve 
storage is sized according to demand (e.g., a tank with larger reserve storage serves more 
customers).
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Tank 2 supplies customers in Area B by gravity. The arrangement of providing supply to 
customers directly from the tank rather than from the connecting pipeline ensures a 
constant pressure is supplied. Water also gravitates from Tank 2 to Tank 3. An Altitude 
Control Valve (ACV) closes when Tank 3 is full to prevent it overflowing. It will open 
when the tank is emptied to a predetermined level, allowing the tank to refill. Tank 3 then 
supplies customers in Area C by gravity. During low demand periods (mainly non 
summer) water gravitates from Tank 2 to Tank 4, and from there is gravity fed to 
customers in Area D. An Altitude Control Valve regulates the flow into Tank 4. During 
the peak summer months WTPB supplies Tank 4 instead of the gravity supply from tank 
2. When WTPB is to be brought into operation for the peak summer period, a valve is 
closed to prevent flow from Tank 2 to Tank 4. There is an interconnection between Tank 
4 and Tank 3, which allows Tank 3 also to receive water from Tank 4.
This section presented a notional water system based on the research of Ezell 
(1998); Ezell, Farr and Wiese (2000b); and Ezell, Haimes, and Lambert (2001). The 
description served as the vignette to apply the Vulnerability Value Model to quantify 
vulnerability.
Summary
Chapter III comprised the research design. The chapter began with an 
explanation of the methodology and the logic behind why a mixed design of qualitative 
and quantitative was necessary to answer the research questions. A qualitative approach 
was used to infer the definition of vulnerability and the relationship of risk and 
vulnerability from the literature. From this definition, a relationship emerged that
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vulnerability is a function of scenario, protection, and importance. The qualitative design 
showed from the literature synthesis that the scenario (threat scenario) is the link between 
vulnerability and risk. Vulnerability highlights the notion of susceptibility to a scenario 
whereas risk focuses on the severity of consequences to a scenario. The centerpiece to 
the chapter was figure 6 as it detailed the research design and graphic form. The figure 
shows how the design is laid out as well as the order in which the design was executed. 
Chapter III showed how user input from subject matter experts was aggregated using the 
weighted linear pool method. It showed how data was collected for weights, value 
function assignment, and system assessment by subject matter experts. Specifically, this 
chapter showed how subject matter experts were used and how their scores were 
aggregated into a consensus input distribution for each measure in the vulnerability value 
model. Next the chapter detailed the design and development of the vulnerability value 
model. System decomposition of a clean water system was presented and the 
justification for the decomposition from the literature and the experts. An example clean 
water system validated from the literature was presented as the example subject matter 
experts would use to assess the system. The design in Chapter III highlighted how the 
model was verified and validated. Finally, the chapter provided the equations for 
calculating vulnerability as well as a table that was used to represent the data collected 
from the model. In Chapter IV, the results of the model are provided as well as the 
supporting analysis.
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Figure 14. Notional Clean Water System




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the data collected and an 
analysis from the vulnerability value model of a clean water system, presented in Chapter 
III. Using the research design detailed in Chapter III, Chapter IV carefully employed the 
design to answer the research questions presented in Chapter I. This chapter begins with 
a summary of the data collected from the subject matter expert for the relative importance 
of system components and subsystems and the determination of the shapes of each value 
function in the model. Next, two subject matter experts reviewed the notional clean 
water system and then scored (assess) the x value for each measure within the model. A 
third subject matter expert was interviewed to assess the level of expertise of subject 
matter experts one and two. The weighted inner loop aggregation simulation was run and 
the resulting distributions are summarized in the chapter and all input distributions are 
provided in Appendix G. The vulnerability value model simulation was executed. The 
results are presented in table 10 followed by explanation and analysis. In addition, the 
chapter shows the major output graphs comparing an ideal system’s performance with the 
performance of the notional system as scored by the subject matter experts. Last, 
sensitivity analysis is discussed and the implication of the sensitivity of the model is 
examined.
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Relative Importance Data
Subject Matter Expert One was asked to rate the relative importance of each 
subsystem and component within the clean water system. Table eight summarizes the 
assessment of relative importance.
Table 8. Relative Importance and Weights
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At the protection measure level, the relative importance of measures varied little. The 
SME noted that these measures were always important regardless of the component being 
assessed. At the component level of the system, relative importance became more 
evident. At the subsystem level, the greatest differences in importance were observed.
The subject matter expert assessed the importance of the source and control subsystems 
very low, 1/3 the importance of the transmission and treatment system, reasoning that the 
source is larger and more robust.
Value Functions
Subject matter expert one set the shape of each of the 56 value functions. Four value 
functions are shown below for deter, detect, delay and respond, corresponding to the river 
source subsystem. All value functions are included in Appendix D.
rV-C'Ter.cs value function X V if. I
wane: 0 0
Postingsigns 1 20
Posting signs and nigh! fighting i 50
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 too
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 so
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and audibfe warn sings 5 90!
The measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
Figure 15. Deter value function from SME-1
Detection vafae function X v{x>
none 0 0
very to i 0.21 5
tow 0.4 10
medium 6.S 30
, .........................  ........................................................................ . ' ,  . . .  . 0.8 75
W9W high " t 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurrrng. Indudes 







Figure 16. Detect value function for SME-1
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OeSs-f sf-iuc Suiciio*! '■V>
No delay 0 0
One minute delay t 10
Five minute delay s 20
16 gtinutft delay i i 45
30 minute delay 5 ? 75
60 minutes delay 120 100
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede 
adversary penetration into or exit from the protected area.
Figure 17. Delay value function for SME-1
R esponse value fiwetkm | i* .
Respond within seconds) 0 100
Respond within one minute! 1 100
Respond within five minute 0 100
Respond within 15 minute! 15 95
Respond within thirty minute! 45 so
Respond within SO minutes! 90 75
Time (minutes! to respond to a  threat
0 15 30
Figure 18. Response value function for SME-1
In figure 15 SME-1 valued deterrence as a monotonically increasing function to the point 
where posted signs, lights, and fencing were in place, putting 100 percent of the value 
here. Beyond that, SME-1 felt a diminishing return for greater deterrence measures, 
hence the monotonically decreasing function. In figure 16, SME-1 placed very little 
value for a medium and below detection probability. Value jumped to 75 percent of total 
value for a detection probability of high (0.8). SME-1 placed 100 percent of value on a 
perfect detection probability. For the delay value function in Figure 17, SME-1 placed 
about 50 percent of the value at a 15 minute delay. The remaining value was spread in a 
linear fashion from 15 minutes to 120 minutes, with 120 minutes receiving 100 percent o f 
the value.
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Scoring (Assessing) the Clean Water System
SME-1 and SME-2 scored the clean water system based on the notional clean 
water system presented in the previous chapter. A summary of their scores are presented 
below in table 9.
Table 9. Summary of assessments for SME-1 
and SME-2
SME-1 (.6) SME-2 |.4)
Comp Min ML Max Min ML Max
1.1.1.2 5.00 30.00 60.00 15.00 25.00 60.00
1.1.1.3 0.10 0.40 0.75 0.20 0.25 0.50
1.1.1.4 10.00 30.00 60.00 1.00 10.00 60.00
1.1.2.2 10.00 20.00 60.00 10.00 20.00 45.00
1.1.2.3 0.40 0.75 1.00 0.20 0.80 1.00
1.1.2.4 5.00 30.00 60.00 5.00 10.00 15.00
1.2.1.2 15.00 30.00 60.00 20.00 35.00 60.00
1.2.1.3 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.50 0.80 1.00
1.2.1.4 1.00 10.00 20.00 5.00 15.00 25.00
1.2.2.2 1.00 5.00 15.00 1.00 5.00 8.00
1.2.2.3 0.40 0.80 1.00 0.50 0.80 1.00
1.2.2.4 2.00 10.00 20.00 5.00 15.00 25.00
1.2.3.2 5.00 20.00 60.00 15.00 25.00 40.00
1.2.3.3 0.20 0.60 1.00 0.20 0.70 0.90
1.2.3.4 5.00 20.00 60.00 5.00 10.00 15.00
1.3.1.2 15.00 30.00 60.00 10.00 20.00 60.00
1.3.1.3 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.50 0.70 1.00
1.3.1.4 5.00 50.00 60.00 10.00 25.00 45.00
1.3.2.2 1.00 10.00 15.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
1.3.2.3 0.40 0.80 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.70
1.3.2.4 2.00 10.00 20.00 5.00 10.00 25.00
1.4.1.2 5.00 30.00 60.00 15.00 35.00 60.00
1.4.1.3 0.40 0.70 0.90 0.50 0.80 1.00
1.4.1.4 5.00 20.00 60.00 5.00 10.00 30.00
1.4.2.2 5.00 20.00 60.00 10.00 30.00 45.00
1.4.2.3 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.60 0.70
1.4.2.4 0.00 5.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 15.00
1.4.3.2 10.00 30.00 60.00 5.00 20.00 30.00
1.4.3.3 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.10 0.30
1.4.3.4 2.00 10.00 20.00 5.00 15.00 25.00
1.5.1.2 20.00 45.00 90.00 20.00 55.00 90.00
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SME-1(.6) SME-2 (.4)
Comp Min ML Max Min ML Max
1.5.1.3 0.40 0.80 0.90 0.10 0.40 0.70
1.5.1.4 5.00 20.00 60.00 5.00 25.00 45.00
1.5.2.2 5.00 30.00 60.00 15.00 40.00 60.00
1.5.2.3 0.50 0.70 0.95 0.40 0.80 0.90
1.5.2.4 5.00 30.00 60.00 10.00 20.00 45.00
1.5.3.2 5.00 15.00 40.00 10.00 20.00 45.00
1.5.3.3 0.60 0.80 0.90 0.70 0.75 0.80
1.5.3.4 10.00 20.00 45.00 10.00 30.00 45.00
1.6.1.2 2.00 10.00 20.00 5.00 20.00 25.00
1.6.1.3 0.50 0.75 0.80 0.60 0.75 0.90
1.6.1.4 5.00 10.00 15.00 10.00 15.00 20.00
Aggregation o f  Scores
SME-3 was interviewed to determine the weighting factors for SME-1 and SME- 
2. After reviewing resumes and using the criteria developed in chapter 3, SME-3 
concluded that SME-1 should receive 0.6 of the total weight and SME-2 receive 0.4 
weight. The major contributing factor was experience in water. SME-3 judged SME-1’s 
experience as more direct and precise, although each had similar educational experiences. 
That said, the experience of SME-2 was considerable and had no impact on the research. 
Using the weighted inner loop aggregation simulation technique advocated by the 
research of Chytka (2003), SME-1 and SME-2 scores were combined into a new 
distribution for use in the clean water system vulnerability value model. A sample of that 
aggregation from 150,000 trials is presented in figure 19 below and the remaining figures 
in appendix G. Figure 19 depicts the assessments of SME-1 and SME-2, modeled as a 
triangle distribution with a minimum score, most likely score and maximum score.
Crystal Ball ran 150,000 trials multiplying a weight of 0.6 times SME-1 random variable
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plus 0.4 times SME-2 random variable. Each random variable was generated with 
respect to each SME triangle distribution. What resulted was a beta distribution with 
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Figure 19. Sample from inner loop aggregation of 
SME-1 and SME-2
Once the aggregation was completed, all input data was supplied to the clean water 
system vulnerability value model. Data is provided in table 10.
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wt X v(x) Comp wt v(x) 0
Sub
sys wt v(x) Q V(X) 0
1.4.3.1 0.25 3.00 1.71
1.4.3.2 0.25 10.02 0.56 1.4.3 0.40 3.95 2.91
1.4.3.3 0.25 0.38 0.16
1.4.3.4 0,25 28.01 1.52
1.5.1.1 0.27 3.00 0.31
1.5.1.2 0.27 12.22 0.46 1.5.1 0.55 3.07 1.60
1.5.1.3 0.23 0.75 0.77
1.5.1.4 0.23 27.70 1.54
1.5.2.1 0.30 1.00 0.01
1.5.2.2 0.26 33.57 0.46 1.5.2 0.27 1.39 0.95 1.5 0.09 4.99 3.59
1.5.2.3 0.22 0.59 0.17
1.5.2.4 0.22 33.62 0.74
1.5.3.1 0.29 0.00 0.00
1.5.3.2 029 6.45 0.10 1.5.3 0.18 0.52 1.04
1.5.3.3 0.21 0.13 0.01
1.5.3.4 0.21 51.80 0.41
1.6.1.1 0,26 2.80 0.79
1.6.1.2 0.26 29.03 2.71 1.6.1 1.00 11,07 3.21 1.6 0.14 11.07 3.21
1.6.1.3 0.24 0.76 2.44
1.6.1.4 0.24 11.07 5.13
Table 11 provides a recap of all input data for columns: measure local wt., x assessment, 
component local wt., and subsystem local wt. Output is italicized by columns measuring 
v(x), component v(x), component omega value, subsystem v(x) and omega value, and 
system V(x) and corresponding omega value. The following charts are additional output 
graphs from the model that provide a pictorial representation of the system’s 
vulnerability.
Figure 20 is a bar graph of overall system value score. The graph shows the ideal 
score and each subsystem’s contribution to the ideal score. The bar to the right is the 
system’s actual value score. Each slice in the bar represents each subsystem’s
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contribution to the score achieved. The difference in the bar graph height is the omega 
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Figure 21. Source Subsystem Value
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In figure 21, the well and river source components were assessed below the ideal score 
for the clean water system. Figures 22-26 reveal the same type of information in that one 









□  Valves (1.2.3)
■  Pipelines (1.2.2)
■ Pump Station (1.2.1)
ideal Scored Value












□  Processes (1.3.2)
□  Facilities (1.3.1)
Ideal Scored Value
Figure 23. Treatment Subsystem Value
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Figure 25. Distribution Subsystem Value










□  SCADA (1.6.1)
Figure 26. Control Subsystem Value
Figure 27 is different from figures 21-26 in that it shows the distribution of values of 
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Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity of the model was assessed in two ways. The first was to look at the 
type of simulation: Monte Carlo and Latin Hyper-cube. For each simulation, the mean, 
median, mode and standard deviation were very close, within 1/100th of 1 percent as 
shown in the table 11 below. However, the Gamma distribution was slightly better fit 
than the Beta distribution for the Latin Hyper-cube simulation. An example o f the Latin 
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Figure 28. Latin Hyper-cube simulation of 15,000 
trials












R- Gamma distribution 
System Vulnerability
Table 11 summarizes the comparison of Monte Carlo and Latin Hyper-cube simulations.
Table 11. Sensitivity o f Simulation Runs: Monte 
Carlo vs. Latin Hyper-cube
Trials Monte Carlo Latin Hyper-cube
150,000 Mean: 32.26 Mean: 32.27
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Trials Monte Carlo Latin Hyper-cube
Median: 32.23 
Mode: 32.18 




Standard Dev: 33.63 
Distribution: Beta
The second way that sensitivity was addressed was to determine which model 
parameters contributed most to output. Figure 29 shows the each parameters contribution 
to variance within the model. This is useful because it allows the user to focus in on what 
assumptions are most important and which are not important.
Sensitivity: System  Vulnerability
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1 1  3 
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Figure 29. Output Sensitivity to Input Parameters
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Eight of 14 detection probabilities are sensitive. A change in detection weights could 
modify the overall system score. Put another way, detection probability is very important 
in the model and lends insight into where one might study the system closely to 
determine where one might improve system performance. Delay is also sensitive. Three 
of 14 components were affected by the delay measure weight. As in the case of 
detection, delay offers insight into how one might improve system performance. The 
areas shaded in grey in table 12 below indicate where in the model measures are 
sensitive. The implication here is that significant changes to the weights from figure 29 
would may change the score. But just as importantly, the parameters identified in figure 
29 also inform the researcher where improvements could be made to improve 
vulnerability in the system.
Table 12. Location of Sensitive Measures in the
Model
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SMEs 1,2,and 3 was shown the model and engaged in a discussion of its design 
and use guided by the semi-structured interview form in Appendix F.. SME-3 admired 
the model and its usefulness in water systems. One criticism was the user interface which 
he considered very poor. Another criticism was that the decomposition although a very 
good approximation of most systems, might have to be changed to account for unique 
designs. For instance, the physical locations of a treatment facility may in some cases be 
so close to the storage component that the decomposition may need to be treated 
differently. SME-3 was asked to comment on the model’s usefulness in other areas such 
as sewage, Supervisory Control and Acquisition Systems or Distributed Control Systems 
exclusively, as well as other infrastructure sectors. Based on the model structure and the 
design, he saw value in each of these areas.
SME-2 was enthused about the model. He liked the fact that the model is built 
upon the values of the experts who know the most about the system. He was concerned 
however, about whether a utility staff could use the model in its current form due to the 
number of spreadsheets and workbooks. One major advantage that SME-2 pointed out 
was the fact that if  he and his staff developed an action plan to change their system in
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response to vulnerability assessment score, they could renter the change and observe how 
the model changed.
SME-1 was concerned that the control system was not decomposed into 
tremendous detail and analyzed separate from the water system. However, accepting 
how the model was designed to work, he agreed that the output would be useful in at a 
minimum understanding where the system was vulnerable. With an actual number, 
omega value in hand, he could approach management with justification to spend 
resources as the model suggested.
Summary
Chapter IV provided the results of the research design. The research design was 
carefully followed to ensure the validity of the results. The clean water system 
vulnerability value model was applied to a notional clean water system and shown to 
quantify vulnerability. The results o f the model indicated an omega value of 
vulnerability of 32. Sensitivity analysis showed the model to be stable for Monte Carlo 
and Latin Hyper-cube random number sampling techniques with virtually no changes in 
output. A sufficiently large trial size of 150,000 provided assurance of the score and the 
distribution of vulnerability and an acceptable standard error. Sensitivity analysis also 
indicated that the detection probability and delay measure are important in that they 
impact the output more than deter and response protection measures. Subject matter 
experts believe that the model does what it claims to do and would be useful in 
quantifying vulnerability to a clean water system. On the question of face validity, all 
SMEs felt the model did what it claimed to do and would be useful in water systems as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
well as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems, Distributed Control Systems 
and other critical infrastructures such as the electric sector.




This research began with four research questions that were introduced in Chapter 
I to guide the scholarly inquiry. Chapter II comprised the literature review to determine 
the extent to which vulnerability needed addressed. It became clear that vulnerability 
was not defined in a rigorous way, nor was it found to be quantified in any previous 
research. This justified the worthiness of this research effort and Chapter III was used to 
develop the methodology and research design that would guide the research. Chapter TV 
provided the results and the analysis of the research. Chapter V begins with a summary 
of the findings o f the research. Next, it provides a discussion of future research to 
improve the body of knowledge on the theory of vulnerability. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the significance of this research and the contribution to 
theory, academia and practice.
This research was comprised of four study questions: (1) What is vulnerability as 
it applies to critical infrastructure systems?, (2) How does risk and systems theory apply 
to critical infrastructure vulnerability?, (3) How can critical infrastructure vulnerability be 
quantified?, and, (4) What results from the deployment of a systems-based model that 
quantifies vulnerability to a critical infrastructure such as a water system? This research 
answered these questions in a rigorous manner using the research design presented in 
Chapter III. This was significant because each question represented a gap in the 
scholarly body of research on critical infrastructure vulnerability.
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As the research conveyed in Chapter II and III, vulnerability is the susceptibility 
of the infrastructure to threat scenarios. This research has shown that vulnerability can be 
quantified by the protection measures of deterrence, detection, delay and response as 
designed in Chapter III and demonstrated in Chapter IV. Quantification of vulnerability 
is meaningful because the omega value of vulnerability can be readily compared to the 
system’s ideal score. This research has shown that the threat scenario is the link between 
risk and vulnerability. Risk is comprised of scenario, likelihood, and consequence and 
vulnerability is comprised of scenario, protection, and relative importance. Systems 
theory was used to inform the vulnerability value model design. Chapter III showed how 
vulnerability could be quantified by using the value model construct. The value model 
provided the logical means to quantify vulnerability because the model is based on the 
values of the experts who know their system. The deployment of the model in Chapter 
IV showed that a clean water system’s vulnerability could be quantified and represented 
mathematically. The result of deploying the model was the quantification of 
vulnerability in a meaningful way. This research provides engineering managers, risk 
professionals and water managers with a means to quantify vulnerability to medium sized 
clean water systems.
Significance
Quantifying vulnerability to clean water systems is a significant contribution because 
the US alone has 54,000 systems providing water to 263 million customers American 
Water Works Association (AWWA) 2002. The number of utilities and customers who 
could benefit from this research in the US alone represents a large number of people.
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This research contributed to the body of knowledge by reviewing and then synthesizing 
the limited literature on vulnerability in Chapter II, culminating with a definition of 
vulnerability and the beginning of a theory of vulnerability for the research community. 
The theory of vulnerability is unique and novel contribution with potential to expand in 
research in many directions of work. But this research did not test the theory of 
vulnerability, as task was beyond the scope. It is however encouraged of the future 
researcher. This research established the link between risk and vulnerability as the threat 
scenario. A discussion of future research on threat scenarios is presented later in this 
chapter. In addition, contributions also included academia and practical (DOD, 
governments, and private industries). The academic contribution to the field of 
engineering management is the systems-based vulnerability model that quantifies 
vulnerability for a critical infrastructure, which until this point has never been 
accomplished. The practical implications of the research include providing decision­
makers with a model to help them understand system vulnerability so that resources can 
be allocated in a meaningful way. Practitioners are provided with the model and the 
references that allow them to conduct their own analysis. The model was significant in 
that the manner in which vulnerability is quantified can be useful in other critical 
infrastructures. The following section discusses ideas and concepts that will hopefully 
motivate future researchers to continue to expand the body of knowledge with respect to 
quantification of Vulnerability-
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Discussion of Future Research
This research has shown how one can quantify vulnerability to clean water 
systems. The research does not demonstrate how one may use the logic of value models 
to quantify vulnerability to other systems or critical infrastructures. For example, electric 
power can be decomposed into subsystems and components and appropriate measures 
identified to measure. In a similar fashion, all critical infrastructures may be decomposed 
and their vulnerability assessed. The idea here is that this research approach should be 
expanded into other critical infrastructures.
One limitation of the value model design is the necessity of independence 
between each component and subsystem. It may be shown that for some systems, 
independence is not possible so there exists a need to account for the dependencies. One 
way to accomplish this is to use interaction matrices and causal diagrams to identify the 
dependencies. Coefficients of dependence might be used to account for dependence 
before applying the value model. For example, causal loop diagrams could indicate the 
influence either the same or opposite. The strengths of those influences could be 
assessed as future research, then accounted for through a coefficient of interaction before 
the data is entered into the Vulnerability Value Model.
Another limitation is that the theory of vulnerability, although novel, is still in the 
beginning stages. Future researchers should design research to test the theory. Future 
researchers might look at the evaluation measures of protection and from additional 
research refine the relationship beyond the triplet presented in this research. In addition, 
a future researcher should develop a complete vulnerability assessment methodology as
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this body of research pointed out in Chapter II that no systems-based methodology can be 
found in the literature.
Vulnerability Index Score
Another potentially useful area of research is designing a vulnerability index 
score that is benchmarked to known standards such as the Homeland Security standard 
for threat level. An index score is useful because national or state policy requirements 
could be associated with each index. For example, figures 30 and 31 show an index of 1- 
4 corresponding to Homeland Security standards.
In practice, any critical infrastructure that achieves a score beyond an acceptable 
level would require action on the part of the stakeholders. Figure 30 is a sample from a 
model that changes color based on vulnerability level. The scores are indexed to 
Homeland Security. The future researcher would want to determine the benchmark to 
create the index. It is believed by the author that a vulnerability index would be a 
significant contribution to Homeland Security. In the final section, threat scenarios were 
identified in this research as the link between risk and vulnerability. Yet this body of 
research did not explore how threat scenarios might be used in quantifying vulnerability. 
The final section provides a background that might be useful for future researchers.
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Figure 31. Vulnerability Index Score
Threat Scenarios
A scenario is defined as an outline, script, or sequence of events (dictionary.com, 
2003). In the discipline of risk analysis, scenarios were made explicit by Kaplan and 
Garrick (1981); Kaplan, Zlotin, and Vishnipolski (1999); and refined by Kaplan, Haimes 
and Garrick (2001). Fundamental to the theory of scenario structuring is the requirement 
that scenarios be (1) complete, (2) finite, and (3) disjoint. In Kaplan and Garrick (1981) 
the authors point out that scenario was loosely defined as “What can go wrong?” In 
Kaplan, Haimes and Garrick (2001); the authors attempt to bridge Hierarchical 
Hologrpahic Modeling (HHM) Haimes (1981), a means for identify sources of risk with 
the theory of uncertainty. The approach focuses on using the philosophy of HHM to 
holistieally identify sources of risk from multiple perspectives: functional, temporal, 
geographical, etc. The authors then introduce rate and weight methodologies to arrive at 
a subset of scenarios from which to proceed. The authors do not address however, how 
one explicitly defines a scenario, nor the limit of the universal set of all risks and 
scenarios. In fact, even if  one satisfies the criteria above, the essential components of the 
scenario remain an open question in the literature.
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AWWA (2002) identify water system scenarios as potentially bad situations for 
desktop exercises. The list is a much less rigorous approach than the academic 
approaches of Kaplan, Haimes, and Garrick. AWWA (2002) did not attempt rigor.
Instead they developed commonsense situations to guide the thought process of how to 
assess the security o f their water system. The limitation of this approach is that 
identifying a simple list of situations as scenarios does not use any formal data to 
substantiate the list of scenarios and therefore they are susceptible to criticism. The list 
of situations, however, are the ones deemed important by the water community.
The Emergency Management Division(EMD) (2001) identifies six hazard 
categories that are useful in addressing scenarios against water systems: biological, 
chemical, nuclear, incendiary, explosive, and cyber. EMD (2001) also use the term 
“target” which is similar to Haimes (1981) “sources of risk” identified with HHM. 
AWWA (2002) presents a similar list that is more closely focused on water 
contamination: blister, nerve, biological, chemical and bacterial hazards. AWWA (2002) 
then estimates the likelihood and severity of each hazard. Whereas some work on 
structuring scenarios is present in the literature, there is no agreed upon definition of 
scenario or unified structure to scenarios. For example, a future researcher might define a 
scenario as a hazard plus an action event (verb) and an object for the action (object): 
hazard + verb + action. There are several techniques in the literature for organizing 
scenarios. Affinity diagramming (Kawakita, 2002) might be used to map AWWA (2002) 
hazards and EMD (2001) scenarios into one hierarchy. To complete the notion of a 
complete scenario (hazard + verb + object), one might use an organized approach to
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hierarchy design such as Armstrong and Sage (1999) and Gibson (1991). Both use the 
notion of verb and object to complete the idea of an objective. To ideate scenarios, many 
techniques exist such as strategy tables, brainstorming, brain writing, dynamic 
confrontation etc. The important point is that this research does not present new theory 
on scenario development. Instead, this research uses well known scenarios and hazards 
and represents them in the form: (1) hazard, (2) verb and (3) object. To be a scenario, all 
three attributes must be present. The theoretical number of possible scenarios then is 
based on the fundamental principle o f counting. The set of all possible scenarios for a 
system is the number of hazards times the number of verbs that describes the action and 
the objects of the action. This might become the universal set of scenarios for a system. 
There is some data available and a more thorough literature review may reveal more.
For example, a survey conducted by Ezell (2003) concluded that the disgruntled 
employee is the most dangerous person of concern to water system managers. Using the 
information from EMD (2001) and AWWA (2002) five scenarios are presented for use in 
the application of quantifying vulnerability to a clean water system. Much reliance is 
placed on the scenarios identified by AWWA (2002) and supplemented by EMD (2001) 
in the form of hazard, verb, and object. Although it is convenient to include additional 
contextual information such as who, when and why, this research uses what (hazard and 
verb) and where (object) for quantifying vulnerability. In summary, constructing a 
scenario is an event comprised of a (1) hazard, (2) verb (action), and (3) object (of the 
action). Scenarios are the taken from the general form and tailored to the system in 
focus.
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Scenario 1: Disgruntled employee damages pumping stations beyond reasonable 
repair that provides water flow for the entire distribution system.
Scenario 2: Terrorist dump a substance** into a water tank that provides clean 
drinking water for a large neighborhood
Scenario 3: Hackers conduct a Denial-of-service attack against the Utility’s 
SCADA System
Using the vulnerability value model, virtually all scenarios could be assessed. 
Dominate scenarios would score the highest and become the basis for allocating 
resources. Determining what scenario to model is potentially an art and a science based 
on the experience of experts, political environment and other factors. Future researchers 
will find this domain an open area to explore. The implication here is that a future 
researcher could infer from the literature and develop a new theory and methodologies of 
scenarios that could be useful to the vulnerability and risk research disciplines.
Summary
This chapter provided a recap of the findings of this research and a discussion of 
future research. This research showed that multiple definitions o f vulnerability and 
quantification has not been adequately addressed. Therefore this research endeavored to 
develop and deploy a systems-based model that quantifies vulnerability to critical 
infrastructure, focusing on clean water systems. This research defined critical 
infrastructure vulnerability as a measure of the susceptibility of critical infrastructure to 
threat scenarios. The research established that vulnerability is a function of 1) threat 
scenario, 2) protection and 3) importance. Also, critical infrastructure vulnerability was
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measured by a system’s 1) deterrence, 2) detection, 3) delay and 4) response capabilities. 
The importance o f components and subsystems in the overall clean water system, implied 
that some subsystems are more critical to overall system performance than other 
subsystems. A value model was used as the logic construct for quantifying vulnerability. 
Subject-matter experts were queried to establish the shapes of value functions and 
importance (weights) in the model. Another set of subject-matter experts were queried to 
assess a notional clean water system with respect to each protection measure within the 
vulnerability value model. To accomplish this, two simulations were executed in the 
model. The first simulation aggregated expert assessments into one assessment. The 
results were then used as inputs into the vulnerability value portion of the model for use 
in the second simulation where vulnerability was quantified. Results o f this research 
demonstrate that vulnerability can be quantified and that quantifying vulnerability is 
useful to decision-makers who prefer quantification to qualitative treatment of 
vulnerability. Subject matter experts agreed that the model passed the face validity test. 
This research is a novel contribution to the body of scholarly work by 1) providing a 
rigorous method to quantify vulnerability to critical infrastructure, 2) introducing the 
beginning of a theory of vulnerability, and 3) specifying the relationship between 
vulnerability and risk. Subject matter experts conclude that there is value in the approach 
put forward in this body of research as it is applied to clean water systems, so it may be 
useful in other critical infrastructures. The research closes with directions for further 
research. Chapter V indicated that research in a vulnerability index score tied to 
Homeland Security, as well as research in scenario design are potentially beneficial areas
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APPENDIX A (Glossary o f Terms)
This glossary of terms does not represent a rigorous set of definitions. It explains how
these terms are used in this research.
1. A system is a group of elements or components that work together for a useful 
purpose (Armstrong and Sage 1999).
2. Critical infrastructure refers to those physical and cyber-based systems essential to 
the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not 
limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water 
systems and emergency services, both governmental and private (PDD 63 1998).
3. Generalizability is as the extension of research findings and conclusions from a 
study conducted on a sample population to the population at large (Palmquist 2003).
4. Risk is a triplet of scenario, likelihood, and consequences (Kaplan 1997).
5. System context refers to a rich description of a system in a way that determines and 
frames its meaning. In systems analysis, contextual appreciation is necessary in 
understanding the problem. System context requires an appreciation of the set of 
circumstances, factors, conditions, values and patterns that are influential in 
constraining and enabling the systems engineering process, the system solution, and 
system solution deployment (Keating 2003a).
6. Systems-Based methodology is viewed from three perspectives along a continuum 
of philosophy, method, and technique. Philosophically, a systems-based 
methodology indicates a view that complex problems should be addressed holistically 
from a systemic perspective using system principles, concepts, and thinking. At the 
“method” level several frameworks can be used and are usually designed within the 
context of the study. And in the case of technique, many tools apply (simulation, 
math programming, etc.)(Keating 2003b)
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7. Triangulation is the process of using multiple data collection methods, data sources, 
or theories to validate the findings of a research study (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & 
Allen, 1993).
8. Transferability is a process performed by readers of research. Readers note the 
specifics of the research situation and compare them to the specifics of an 
environment or situation with which they are familiar. If there are enough similarities 
between the two situations, readers may be able to infer that the results of the research 
would be the same or similar in their own situation. In other words, they "transfer" 
the results of a study to another context (Palmquist 2003).
9. Traceability refers to tracking and confirming the steps and procedures used by the 
researcher in developing the research concepts and administering the research design 
strategy. Traceability strives to ensure credibility and fidelity in the research 
explanation, data collection, analysis, and findings (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & 
Allen, 1993).
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APPENDIX B SME-1 Interview Template and Notes
This interview is part of my research to fulfill requirements for a PhD in Engineering 
Management from the Department of Engineering Management and Systems 
Engineering, Old Dominion University.
Do you agree to participate? Sign and date:___________________
1. Describe your experience?
2. How many years of experience do you have in water systems?
3. What duties do you perform?
4. How many years have you been employed at Fort Monroe, VA Public Works?
5. Based on research from the American Water Works Association, a clean water 
system can be functionally decomposed into the following areas (Show him the 
decomposition). Based on your experience do you agree or disagree with this 
representation?
6. If you disagree, how would you modify the representation?
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APPENDIX €  SME-2 Establishing the Importance Weights
Instructions:
Rate your expertise cm Water by stems on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is poor and 10 is the very best in the 
business. 7
How many years of experience do you have in water systems? 19
Please describe (below) what you believe makes an expert in water systems
Note that self rating "expertise'' is highly subjective. This is a very general question that can be a thesis question 
in itself. I'll try to take a stab at it. Expertise can be from the engineering/design standpoint- work with utilities to 
improve or upgrade operations a id  processes or equipment, after on-site study of issues such as existing 
infrastructure, required future demands and capital improvements, etc. Other experts come from the 
operations/management end, usually employed by the utility or Operations and M&iagement Company, with 
hands on capabilities in the day to day operations of the system. Note that these are rough generalizations and 
there is mobility between the two broad broupings.
**Upon completion, email this spreadsheet and your vitae or 
resume to barry.ezell@us.army.mil
Clean Water System
Transmit Treat Store Control
BeTPiprngISvc Piping 




This picture represents a dean water system that is functionally decomposed into the subsystems and components shown above.
The research asserts that protection can be measured by assessing deterrence, detection, delay and response.
This consultation requests that you rate the "relative importance" of the subsystems, components and evaluation measures in this model. 
Please dick the next tab...
Thank you for your help.
Subsystem:




Clean W ater System
On a scale  of 1 to  10...
Ex. Expert Comment on why you changed
1.0 Source 3 3 to 9
For weHs, sources are usually multiple wells in a  field. Contamination or loss of 
one well would be an inconvenience but ra t a  disaster, hence a  rating of 3 
Contamination of a surface water source or run of river is usually much more 
difficult than an individual well but the effects can be more profound, hence a 
rating of 9
2.0 Transmit 4 9
•^-Transmission mains can be a weak link in a  water distribution system, and 
because of their long run, typically including isolated areas sabatoge can lead to 
disruption of service for prolonged periods.
3.0 Treat 10 9
For a water treatment plant, being out of commission can lead to extended loss of 
service from several days to weeks or months depending upon the extent of 
damage or contamination.
4.0 Store 5 6
Storage is important a s  contamination or distraction of storage can leave an 
e=area isolated for extended periods of time
5.0 Distribute 7 3
Usually, the distribution system is divided into zones that can be isolated (by 
manual valves) when either a  coomonplace disruption accurs (e.g. main burst) or 
sabotage
6.0 Control (SCADA) 8 5
In an emergency, aproperty designed system can be operated, albeit with more 
difficulty and degraded efficiency, off line (I.e. in manual mode)
When you consider the overall importance 
of each subsystem of a  dean  water system 
decomposed below, rate the relative 
importance of each susbsystem to the 
accomplishement of the purpose of the 
clean water system where 1 is not 
important and 10 is absolutely important, 
importance is an important measure of 
vulnerability. The more important a  sub­
system function to overall system 
performance, Increases the vulnerability.
Example lewd of 
importance
When you consider the overall importance 
of each subsystem of a dean  water system 
decomposed below, rate the relative 
importance of each susbsystem to the 
accomplishement of the purpose erf the 
dean  water system where 1 is not 
important and 10 is absolutely important.
1.0 Source
On a  scale  of 1 to  10
Ex. Expert Comment on why you changed
River 4 9
Loss of ran of river source would usually put the system out of commission until 
contamination can be remedied.
Weils 9 3 Usually mutiple wells in field. Loss of single well is more a nuisance than critical
When you consider the overall importance 
of each subsystem of a  d ean  water system 
decomposed below, rate the relative 
importance of each susbsystem to the 
accomplishement of the purpose of the 
dean  water system where 1 is not 
important and 10 is absolutely important.
3.0 Treat
On a  sca le  of 1 to 10
Ex. Expert Comment on why you changed
Facilities 10 10
Agree wih raing. Not sure how you can devide facilities and processes. 
Destruction of facilities, if the intention is physical infrastructure is of course more 
difficult and time consuming to correct than disruption of processes, which may 
include sabotage of the SCADA system if distributed automated control used.
Processes 10 9 Disruption of process, usually can be contained by manual override
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When you consider the overall importance 
of each subsystem of a  dean  water system 
decomposed below, rate the relative 
importance of each susbsystem to the 
accomplishement of the purpose of the 
dean  water system where 1 is not 
important and 10 is absolutely important
4.0 Store
On a  sca le  of 1 to  10
Ex. Expert Comment on why you changed
Ctearwei! 7 9
Tanks are more localized. Contamination of dearwell can put the WTP out of 
service until it can be drained and deaned. Physical damage to derarwell of 
course is more time consuming to rredify and hence more serious.
Tank g 6
Tanks usually serve a local area. Elevated tanks are more for prssure regulation 
than long term storage.
Reservoir 10 10
Reservoirs generally serve a  larger area than tanks and are more difficult to drain 
and dean  in the event of contamination.
W hen you consider the overall importance 
of each subsystem of a  d ean  water system 
decomposed below, rate the relative 
importance of each susbsystem to the 
accomplishement of the purpose of the 
d e a n  water system where 1 is not 
important and 10 is absolutely important.
5.0 D istribute
On a  sc a le  of 1 to  10
Ex. Expert Com m ent on  why you changed
Pump Station 10 6
Pump system s are more difficult to repair or replace than pipe. As a rule, service 
an extended area and cannot be isolated by valves
Delivery Piping System 7 3 <~Relatively lower ratings due to localized nature, (to neighborhood)
Service Piping System 3 2 <-Relatively lower ratings due to localized nature, (to single customer)
Rate the relative importance of deterrence, detection, delay, and response for each comp 

















> deterrence 9 > deterrence 10
> detection 9 > detection 10
> delay 8 > delay 10










> deterrence 10 > deterrence 10 > deterrence 8
> detection - 10 > detection 10 > detection 8
> delay 9 > delay 9 > delay 7
> response 9 > response 10 > response 7
> deterrence 7 > deterrence 10 > deterrence 7
> detection 8 > detection 10 > detection 6
> delay 6 > delay 8 > deiay 5
> response 6 > response 8 > response 5
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APPENDIX D SME-2 Establishing the Value Function 
Instructions:
Adjust the cell under the V(x) column and determine the shape of the value function.
 s & 9 B B " 3 2 Z S - I i l
X I  m .... i - -• - ...... -.....- .......... -••• -................
None 0 0 i
Posting signs 1 20
Posting $g n s and night lighting 2 50 i $ m
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 100
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple tam ers 4 90 !
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple tam ers and audible wamgings 5 90 0S 1 15 1 25 7 . 4* » ,
The m easures implemented that are perceived by adversaries a s  too difficult to defeat. OMQUQftCQ
Detection value function X itfx)
nonel 0 0
very tow 0.2 5 i w
towi 0.4 10
medium 0.6 30 *
high 0,8 75 a
very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. Includes 
sensing, communicating alarm to control center, and assessing the alarm.
i Detoctten
Delay value function X .....Y ® ..... I I
No delay 0 0 100
One minute delay 1 10 j 75
Five minute delay 5 20 ; £  so
15 minute delay 15 45 i  *
30 minute delay 30 75
60 minutes delay 120 100 0 20 40 00 80 100 120
Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system designed to impede adversary 
penetration into or exit from the protected area. i
D aisy
Response value function X v(x) r ' —
Respond within oneminufe 1 100 ! „ I i
Respond within five minute 5 100 \ ■> "
Respond within 15 minute 15 95 *
Respond within ttiirty minute 45 80 0 1 5 30 45 SO 75 90 j
Respond within 60 minutes 90 75 Response \
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat -  ........... - -----  ------------- ----
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Deterrence value function X
None 0 0 j  ■— «-------- -
Posting signs 1 5 /
Posting signs and night lighting 2 25 ■s * /
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 100 ___ ■*
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 90 - ■ ■ „ . . ..
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90 • EHiMWiiirmi m, u
The measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too difficult to defeat.





Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocunred or is ocurring- Includes
Delay value function <tx)
No delay
One minute delay
Five minute delay 20
45
Delay60 minutes delay 120 100
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversary
Response value function m .
Respond within seconds] 100
Respond within one mini 100
Respond within five mi 100
Respond within 15 mil
Respond within thirty minuti 45
ResponseRespond within 60 miriutesl 90
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat
Pump Station
Deterrence value function X V(X)
None 0 0
Posting signs 1 5
Posting signs and night lighting 2 10
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 1 0 0
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90
The measures implemented that aie perceived by adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
Detection value function X m r ........
none 0 0 [ 100 1 j
very tow 0.2 5 ! rs ;
low 0.4 10
■ * 50 (
medium 0.6 30 ! v
high 0.8 75 ; 25
very high 1 100 o<
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. Includes 
sensing, communicating alarm to control center, and assessing the alarm.
j £ 02 0 4  OS 06  
Defection |
Delay value function X m - -
No delay 0 0 i
One minute delay 1 10
Five minute delay 5 20
15 minute delay 15 45 j
30 minute delay 30 75 i 20 40 60 SO 100 120
60 minutes delay 120 100 Delay
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversary ■ ....— ............- ........... ...
R esponse value function X v(x) ..........-.............. ... -................- - ....
Respond within seconds 0 100 too.
Respond within one minute 1 100
Respond wiMi five minute 5 100 sT
Respond wShsi 15 minute 15 95 ■ 0
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 ; 3 15 30 45 80 75 19
Respond within 60 minutes 90 25 Response
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat
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Deterrence veto* function |  x ..- f t f t . -
None! 0 0 ------
Posling signs! 1 5 75
Posttig signs and night fighting! 2 10 ! 5 50
Posttig signs, night lighting a id  fencing! 3 60 I 25 * — -aT
Posting signs, night fighting a id  multiple banters] 4 100 j < ' 2 3 4 5
Posting signs, night fighting, multiple banters and audible wamgingsf 5 90 Deterrence
The measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too difficult to defeat. ........ . - —
Detection value function X m
none! 0 0 !
very tow 0.2 5 i
tow 0.4 10 i
medium 0.6 30
high 0.8 75
very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocuned or is ocurring. Includes
Delay value function X vfx)
Nodelay 0 0
One minute delay 1 10
Five minute delay 5 20
15 minute delay 15 45
30 minute delay 30 75
60 minutes delay 120 100
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversary
Delay
Response value function X
Respond within seconds 0 100
Respond within one minute 1 100
Respond within five minute 5 100
Respond within 15 minute 15 95
Respond within Mrty minute 45 80
Respond within 60 minutes 90 25




Posttig signs and night lighting
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers







































Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversai
Daisy
R esponse value function
Respond within seconds
Respond within one minute
Respond within five minute
Respond within 15 minute
Respond within thirty minute
Time (minutes) to respond to a  threat
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rau iliu es
Deterrence value ta c t io n X vfr)
None 0 0
Posting signs 1 5
Posting signs a id  night lighting 2 10
Posting signs, night i&vting and fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 100
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90
The measures implemented that are perceived bv adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
Defection value function X v(x»
none 0 0




very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. Includes 
















Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system designed to impede adversary 
or exit from the protected a re a ______________________________________
■ H t t f Response value function
Respond within seconds
Respond within one minute
Respond within five minute
Respond within 15 minute
Respond within thirty minute
Time i minutest to i us pond to a threat











Deterrence value function X Vtxj ......-  .............. ................................  ,
None 0 0 j "----- - , i ' i
Posting signs 1 5 !
Posting signs and night lighting 2 10 ! V “
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 100 i > ---- - --- ----- - ------------------ I
Posting signs, night fighting, multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90 OMeftwiee
The measures implemented that are perceived bv adversaries as too difficult to defeat. ...— —  ■ .......... ................ ’-------------------
Detection value function X m ..-.....................
none 0 0 i 1 •
very low 0.2 5 i
low 0.4 10 j 5  » !
medium 0.6 30 1
high 0.8 75 o'l 01 as «. as as a? as «»
very high 1 100 Datec&K |
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurhna. indudes
Delay value function X .  m -------  '
No delay 0 0 i w
One minute delay 1 10 i ~  ” 1
Five minute delay 5 20 | T i
15 minute delay 15 45 j
30 minute delay 30 75 d 28 40 SO SO ICO 120 j
60 minutes delay 120 100 Delay j
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversary !------ ..........- - .....-....... -...................  *............J
Response value function X _ s a _
Respond within seconds 0 100 1 100
Respond within one minute 1 100
Respond within five minute 5 100 ! T
Respond wfihin 15 minute 15 95
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 0 15 30 45 80 75 SO '
Respond within 60 minutes 90 50 Response
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat I
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_______________________________ ___
DsfteTSitCe vsSu® SSMCtfOft X m
None 0 0
Posting signs 1 s
Posting signs and n$M lighting 2 10
Posting signs, night lighting a id  fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multipie barriers 4 100
Posting signs, night fighting, multiple banters and audible wamgings 5 90
The measures implemented that are perceived bv adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
Detection value function X vOG
none 0 0




very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. Includes 
sensing, communicating alarm to control center, and assessing the alarm.
Delay value function I X v(x)
No delay! 0 0
One minute delay! 1 10
Five minute delay! 5 20
15 minute delay! 15 45
30 minute delay! 30 75
60 minutes detayl 120 100
Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversary 
penetration into or exit from the protected area.
Response value function X v(x) !"
Respond within seconds 0 100
Respond within one minute 1 100
Respond within five minute 5 100 >
Respond within 15 minute 15 95
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 IS 30 45 80 75 90
Respond within 60 minutes 90 40 Response
T me im nutes) to respond to a threat
Tank
Deterrence value function X V(X) ,------------------  - ■—  ' -  -
None 0 0
Posting signs 1 5 ! 75 i
Posting signs and night lighting 2 1 0 >
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 7 5 i
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 1 0 0 I 0 1 2 3 - 4  S '
Posting signs, night fighting, multiple barriers and audible warnings 5 9 0 Deterrence
The measures implemented that are perceived bv adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
Detection value function X v(x)
none 0 0
very low 0 .2 5 j ~  ” i
low 0 .4 1 0 | T !
medium 0 .6 3 0 i
high 0 .8 7 5 ! o Of 06 OS 1 i
very high 1 1 0 0 D etection
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurrino. Includes l- ..........
Delay vain® function X V(x> ----------------- - — — L _ J J — J L 1!1! . ,
No delay 0 0 ; tOO 1.................................................. .............— ....- - |
One minute delav 1 10 i 73
Five minute delay 5 2 0 I Y  “
1 5  minute delay 1 5 4 5 '
3 0  minute delay 3 0 7 5 0 20 40 SO 80 100 120 ,
SO minutes delay 1 2 0 100 Delay
Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system designed to impede adversary --------------------L--------------------------------------------------------- _ J
R esponse value function X J S » ..... " ' .............. •" ^
Respond within seconds 0 1 0 0 j TOO
Respond within one minute 1 1 0 0 I ^  75 i
Respond wiihin five minute 5 1 0 0 i T  50
Respond within 15 minute 15 9 5
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 0 15 30 45 eo 75 90 i
Respond within 60 minutes SO 3 5 Response
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Posting atgns
Postmg signs a id  nignt Hgpntng
Posting sans, ntght itgmmg and fencing
Posting signs, night lighting and muftipte barters
Postgig signs, night lighting, multiple barners and audible wamgings
Die measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries a s  too difficult to








Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurrina. Includesjjijjj
Delay value function X vM i
No delay 0 0 1 100 ■
One minute delay i 10
Five msnite delay 5 20 T  50
15 minute delay 15 45 01
30 minute delay 30 75 20 40 80 B0 100 120 !
60 minutes delay 120 100 : Delay
Time (minutest that an element of a ohvsical brotection system designed to imoede adversary i
Response value function X .. ............................ '
Respond withm seconds 0 100 1001
Respond within one minute 1 100 * I
Respond within five minute 5 100 1
Respond within 15 minute 15 95 0 :
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 c 15 30 4S 60 79 90 :
Respond within 60 minutes 90 75 Response t
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat . . ......... ........._ ..................... . ............. ;
Pump Station ■ I f
Deterrence value function X V(X) f-----------------
None 0 0 j 100
Posting signs 1 5 1 75 !
Posting signs and night lighting 2 10 ^ SO X 1
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 60 25 / j
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 100 0 ! - ---A— --------
Posting signs, night lightbig. multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90 1 0 1 2  3 4 5 i
The measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
!
Deterrence
Detection value function X V(x) ......... - ..... ......-.... -.........-.................. “ I
none 0 0 100 ' 1
very low 0.2 5 75
low 0.4 10
medium 0.6 30 s - !
high 0.8 75 25 j
very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. Includes 
sensing, communicathg alarm to control center, and assessing the alarm.






15 minute c 15
30 minute ( 30






Time (minutes) that an element of a  physical protection system designed to impede adversai
Delay
in
Response value function X v »  r
Respond within seconds 0 100 !
Respond within one minute 1 100
Respond within five minute 5 100
Respond within 15 minute 15 95 !
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 |
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r—  -.....-Set_ X ------- --  -
None 0 0
Posting signs 1 5
Posting signs and night lighting 2 10
Posting signs, night lighting a id  fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barters 4 100 0 1 7  3 4 5
Posting signs, night lighting, multipie barriers and audible wamgings 5 90 Oatenem*
The measures implemented that are perceived bv adversaries as too difficult to defeat. I----
Detection value function X
nonel o 0 I
very low 0.2 5
few! 0.4 10
j T  M
medium 0.6 30 !
high 0.8 75 ! 02 04 bS
very high 1 100 Detection
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. includes -------- ----------------- ------ -
Delay value function X v(x)
Nodelay 0 0 ---------------- ---------------——■i
One minute delay 1 10
Five minute delay 5 20 ...................
15 minute delay 15 45 0
30 minute delay 30 75 0 20 40 SO 80 100 120 ;
60 minutes delay 120 100 Delay
Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system designed to impede adversary
Response value function X Wx>
Respond within seconds 0 100 too j
Respond within one minute 1 100 75 I
Respond wiffitn five minute 5 100 a?
Respond wttifri 15 minute 15 95 0
Respond wtthsi thirty minute 45 80 0 15 30 45 SO 75 SO
Respond within 60 minutes 90 25 j Response
Time iminutes) to respond to a threat ....................-... .. ...... .........—:
S y e P i p M g S y s t e m
Deterrence value function X WX)
None 0 0 ......... ................... .........
Posting signs 1 5
Posting signs and night lighting 2 10 j T 50
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 60 | 25
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 100 1 2 3 « 5 |
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90 Deterrence
The measures implemented that are perceived bv adversaries as too difficult to defeat. I
Detection value function X vtx) r....... ................................. - ..................—  .j
none 0 0 1 !
very tow 0.2 5
low 0.4 10 r  * \
medium 0.6 30 1
high 0.8 75 i 03 04 ae as , !
very high 1 100 ; D etection
Delay value function X V(X> !-------
No delay 0 0 ; 100
One minute delay 1 10 !
Five minute delay 5 20 j V 50 i
15 minute delay 15 45 i 0
30 minute delay 30 75 i 0 20 40 SO 80 100 120 '
60 minutes delay 120 100 ) Delay
Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system designed to impede adversary --------------— -------- ----------------- ------------
Response value function X V M
Respond w*hin seconds 0 100 i too
Respond within one minute 1 100
Respond within five minute 5 100 >
Respond wfthin 15 minute 15 95 \ 0 1
Respond within thirty minute 45 80 0 15 30 48 60 75 f*  !
Respond within 60 minutes 90 25 Response i
Time (minutes) to respond to a threat . ......................... ............. ............. . ... _ ...!
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Detefirwice value function X m
None 0 0
Posting signs 1 5
Posting signs and night lighting 2 10
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 60
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 100
Posting signs, night lighting, muffiple barriers and audible wamgings 5 90
The measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too difficult to defeat.
Detection value function X *00
none 0 0




very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is ocurring. Includes 






0 0 2 0.4 0 8
Delay value function x -
No delay 0 0
One minute delay 1 10
Five minute delay 5 20
15 minute delay 15 45
30 minute delay 30 75
60 minutes delay 120 100
Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system designed to impede adversary
Delay
R esponse value function X vtx)
Respond within seconds 0 100 1
Respond within one minute 1 100 !
Respond within five minute 5 100
Respond within 15 minute 15 95
Respond within thirty minute 45 80
Respond within 60 minutes 90 25
Time (minutes) to respond to a  threat
Response
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APPENDIX E SME-1 and -2 CWS Assessment
Shown below is a sample of the spreadsheet that the SMEs used to score the clean water system. Below the example is the raw data 
from both SMEs organized into a table.
River Source
Deterrence value function X v(x)
None 0 1 m rn a m  Min Most Likely Max
Posting signs 1 10 fx axis | 1 3 5
Posting signs and night lighting 2 30
Comment:
Posting signs, night lighting and fencing 3 80
Posting signs, night lighting and multiple barriers 4 60
Posting signs, night lighting, multiple barriers and 5 100
The measures implemented that are perceived by adversaries as too
Evaluation measure source Garcia, 2001
Value function source SME-1
Type of evaluation measure Direct,
Detection value function X v(x)
none 0 0 Min Most Likely Max





very high 1 100
Probability of determining that an unauthorized action has ocurred or is
Evaluation measure source Garcia, 2001
Value function source SME-2
















Time (minutes) that an element of a physical protection system
Evaluation measure source
Value function source































































1.1.1.1 Source River Source Delay 5 30 60
1.1.2.1 Source Well Source Delay 1 5 15
1.2.1.1 Transmit Trans Pump Station Delay 1 10 15
1.2.2.1 Transmit Pipeline Delay 10 30 60
1.2.3.1 Transmit Valves Delay 5 15 40
1.3.1.1 Treat Facilities Delay 5 30 60
1.3.2.1 Treat Processes Delay 5 20 60
1.4.1.1 Store Clearwell Delay 5 20 60
1.4.2.1 Store Tank Delay 5 20 60
1.4.3.1 Store Reservoir Delay 5 10 15
1.5.1.1 Distribute Distr Pump Station Delay 1 10 20
1.5.2.1 Distribute Del Piping System Delay 5 50 60
1.5.3.1 Distribute S vc Piping System Delay 0 5 10
1.6.1.1 Control SCADA Delay 5 . 30 60
1.1.1.2 Source River Source Detection 0.4 0.75 1
1.1.2.2 Source Well Source Detection 0.2 0.6 1
1.2.1.2 Transmit Trans Pump Station Detection 0.4 0.8 1
1.2.2.2 Transmit Pipeline Detection 0.4 0.8 0.9
1.2.3.2 Transmit Valves Detection 0.5 0.75 0.8
1.3.1.2 Treat Facilities Detection 0.5 0.8 0.9
1.3.2.2 Treat Processes Detection 0.5 0.8 1
1.4.1.2 Store Clearwell Detection 0.5 0.8 1
1.4.2.2 Store Tank Detection 0.4 0.7 1
1.4.3.2 Store Reservoir Detection 0.1 0.4 0.75
1.5.1.2 Distribute Distr Pump Station Detection 0.4 0.8 1
1.5.2.2 Distribute Del Piping System Detection 0.4 0.8 1
1.5.3.2 Distribute S vc Piping System Detection 0 0.1 0.3
1.6.1.2 Control SCADA Detection 0.6 0.8 0.9
1.1.1.3 Source River Source Deterrence 3
1.1.2.3 Source Well Source Deterrence 3
1.2.1.3 Transmit Trans Pump Station Deterrence 3
1.2.2.3 Transmit Pipeline Deterrence 0
1.2.3.3 Transmit Valves Deterrence 3
1.3.1.3 Treat Facilities Deterrence 4
1.3.2.3 Treat Processes Deterrence 4
1.4.1.3 Store Clearwell Deterrence 2
1.4.2.3 Store Tank Deterrence 3
1.4.3.3 Store Reservoir Deterrence 3
1.5.1.3 Distribute Distr Pump Station Deterrence 3
1.5.2.3 Distribute Del Piping System Deterrence 1
1.5.3.3 Distribute S vc Piping System Deterrence 0
1.6.1.3 Control SCADA Deterrence 4
1.1.1.4 Source River Source Response 15 30 60
1.1.2.4 Source Well Source Response 15 30 60
1.2.1.4 Transmit Trans Pump Station Response 5 20 60
1.2.2.4 Transmit Pipeline Response 5 30 60
1.2.3.4 Transmit Valves Response 10 30 60
1.3.1.4 Treat Facilities Response 2 10 20
1.3.2.4 Treat Processes Response 2 10 20
1.4.1.4 Store Clearwell Response 2 10 20
1.4.2.4 Store Tank Response 10 20 45
1.4.3.4 Store Reservoir Response 10 20 60
1.5.1.4 Distribute Distr Pump Station Response 5 20 60
1.5.2.4 Distribute Del Piping System Response 5 30 60
1.5.3.4 Distribute S vc Piping System Response 20 45 90
1.6.1.4 Control SCADA Response 2 10 20




1.1.1.1 Source River Source Delay 1 10
1.1.2.1 Source Well Source Delay 1 5
1.2.1.1 Transmit Trans Pump Station Delay 5 10
t.2.2.1 Transmit Pipeline Delay 5 15
1.2.3.1 Transmit Valves Delay 10 20
1.3.1.1 Treat Facilities Delay 5 10
1.3.2.1 Treat Processes Delay 5 10
1.4.1.1 Store Clearwell Delay 5 10
1.4.2.1 Store Tank Delay 5 25
1.4.3.1 Store Reservoir Delay 5 10
1.5.1.1 Distribute Distr Pump Station Delay 5 15
1.5.2.1 Distribute Del Piping System Delay 10 25
1.5.3.1 Distribute S vc Piping System Delay 1 10
1.6.1.1 Control SCADA Delay 10 20
1.1.1.2 Source River Source Detection 0.2 0.8
1.1.2.2 Source Well Source Detection 0.2 0.7
1.2.1.2 Transmit Trans Pump Station Detection 0.5 0.8
1.2.2.2 Transmit Pipeline Detection 0.1 0.4
1.2.3.2 Transmit Valves Detection 0.6 0.75
1.3.1.2 Treat Facilities Detection 0.5 0.8
1.3.2.2 Treat Processes Detection 0.5 0.7
1.4.1.2 Store Clearwell Detection 0.4 0.6
1.4.2.2 Store Tank Detection 0.4 0.8
1.4.3.2 Store Reservoir Detection 0.2 0.25
1.5.1.2 Distribute Distr Pump Station Detection 0.5 0.8
1.5.2.2 Distribute Del Piping System Detection 0.1 0.3
1.5.3.2 Distribute S vc Piping System Detection 0 0.1
1.6.1.2 Control SCADA Detection 0.7 0.75
1.1.1.3 Source River Source Deterrence 3
1.1.2.3 Source Well Source Deterrence 3
1.2.1.3 Transmit Trans Pump Station Deterrence 3
1.2.2.3 Transmit Pipeline Deterrence 1
1.2.3.3 Transmit Valves Deterrence 3
1.3.1.3 Treat Facilities Deterrence 4
1.3.2.3 Treat Processes Deterrence 4
1.4.1.3 Store Clearwell Deterrence 3
1.4.2.3 Store Tank Deterrence 3
1.4.3.3 Store Reservoir Deterrence 3
1.5.1.3 Distribute Distr Pump Station Deterrence 3
1.5.2.3 Distribute Del Piping System Deterrence 1
1.5.3.3 Distribute S vc Piping System Deterrence 0
1.6.1.3 Control SCADA Deterrence 1
1.1.1.4 Source River Source Response 15 30
1.1.2.4 Source Well Source Response 10 20
1.2.1.4 Transmit Trans Pump Station Response 10 30
1.2.2.4 Transmit Pipeline Response 15 40
1.2.3.4 Transmit Valves Response 10 30
1.3.1.4 Treat Facilities Response 5 15
1.3.2.4 Treat Processes Response 5 15
1.4.1.4 Store Clearwell Response 5 15
1.4.2.4 Store Tank Response 10 30
1.4.3.4 Store Reservoir Response 10 20
1.5.1.4 Distribute Distr Pump Station Response 15 25
1.5.2.4 Distribute Del Piping System Response 15 35
1.5.3.4 Distribute S vc Piping System Response 20 45
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Listed below is a summary of the assessments, assumptions, and forecast means for the 
aggregation of SME one and two.
SME1{.6) SME2 (.4)
C om p Min ML Max D istr Min ML Max D istr Combined
1.1.1.2 5.00 30.00 60.00 31 6,' 15.00 25 .00 60 .00 33 .3 3 3 2 .33
1.1.1.3 0.10 0.40 0 .75 0.42 0 2 0 0.25 0.50 0.32 0.38
1.1.1.4 10.00 30.00 60 .00 33.33 1.00 10.00 6 0 .0 0 ! 2367 29.47
1.1.2.2 10.00 20.00 60 .00 30.00 10.00 20 .00 45 .00 25.00 28 .00
1.1.2.3 0.40 0.75 1.00 0.72 0.20 0.80 1.00 0.67 0.70
1.1.2.4 5.00  30 .00 60.00 31.67 5.00 10.00 15.00 10.00 23.00
1.2.1.2 15.00 30 .00 60.00 3500 20 .00 35.00 60 .00 38.33 36.33
1.2.1.3 0.50 0.80 0.90 073 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.77 0.75
1.2.1.4 1.00 10.00 20.00 10.33 5.00 15.00 25.00 15.00 12J20
1.2.2.2 1.00 5.00 15.00 760 1.00 5.00 8 .00 4.67 6.07
1.2.2.3 0.40 0.80 1.00 0.73 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.77 0.75
1.2.2.4 2.00 10.00 20 .00 1067 5.00 15.00 25.00 15.00 12.40
1.2.3.2 5.00  20 .00 60 .00 2833 15.00 25 .00 40.00 26.67 2767
1.2.3.3 0.20 0 .60 1.00 060 0 2 0 0.70 0.90 0.60 0.60
1.2.3.4 5.00 20 .00 60 .00 28.33 5.00 10.00 15.00 1000 21.00
1.3.1.2 15.00 30.00 60 .00 35.00 10.00 20 .00 60 .00 30.00 33.00
1.3.1.3 0.50 0.80 1.00 077 0.50 0.70 1.00 0.73 0.75
1.3.1.4 5.00  50 .00 60 .00 38.33 10.00 25 .00 45.00 26.67 33.67
1.3.2.2 1.00 10.00 15.00 8.67 5.00 15.00 20 .00 13.33 10.53
1.3.2.3 0 .40 0.80 1.00 0.73 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.37 0.59
1.3.2.4 2 .00 10.00 20 .00 10.67 5.00 10.00 25 .00 13 33 11.73
1.4.1.2 5.00 30.00 60 .00 31.67 15.00 35.00 60 .00 36.67 33.67
1.4.1.3 0.40 0.70 0.90 0.67 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.77 0.71
1.4.1.4 5.00 20 .00 60.00 28.33 5.00 10.00 30.00 15.00 23.00
1.4.2.2 5.00 20 .00 60 .00 23.33 10.00 30 .00 45.00 28.33 28.33
1.4.2.3 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.77 0.40 0.60 0.70 0.57 0.69
1.4.2.4 0.00 5.00 10.00 5.00 1.00 10.00 15.00 867 6.47
1.4.3.2 10.00 30.00 60 .00 3333 5.00  20 .00 30.00 18.33 27.33
1.4.3.3 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.13
1.4.3.4 2.00 10.00 20 .00 10,67 5.00 15.00 25.00 15.00 12.40
1.5.1.2 20.00 45 .00 90 .00 51.67 2 0 .00  55.00 90.00 55.00 53 .0 0
1.5.1.3 0.40 0.80 0.90 070 0.10 0.40 0.70 0.40 0 .58
1.5.1.4 5.00 20 .00 60 .00 28.33 5.00  25 .00 45 .00 25.00 27.00
1.5.2.2 5.00 30.00 60 .00 31.67 15.00 40 .00 60 .00 38.33 34.33
1.5.2.3 0.50 0 .70 0.95 0.72 0.40 0.80 0.90 0.70 0.71
1.5.2.4 5.00 30.00 60 .00 31.67 10.00 20 .00 45 .00 25.00 2 9 .0 0
1.5.3.2 5.00 15.00 40 .00 20.00 10.00 20 .00 45 .00 25.00 22 .00
1.5.3.3 0.60 0.80 0.90 0.77 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.75 0.76
1.5.3.4 10.00 20 .00 45 .00 25.00 10.00 30 .00 45 .00 28 33 26.33
1.6.1.2 2.00 10.00 20 .00 10.67 5.00  20 .00 25.00 16.67 13.07
1.6.1.3 0 .50 0.75 0.80 068 0.60 0.75 0.90 0.75 0.71
1.6.1.4 5.00 10.00 15.00 10.00 10.00 15.00 20 .00 15.00 12.00
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APPENDIX F SME-3 Weighting Factors (SME-1 and -2)
This interview is part of my research to fulfill requirements for a PhD in 
Engineering Management from the Department of Engineering Management and Systems 
Engineering, Old Dominion University.
Do you agree to participate? Sign and date:_____________________________________
1. Describe your experience?
2. How many years of experience do you have in water systems?
3. What duties do you perform?
4. Based on the expert criteria presented in each SME’s resume, rate their expertise 
on a scale o f one to ten as it applies to clean water systems.
Expert Criteria:
Criteria SME-1 (wt: 1-10) SME-2 (1-10)
Years of Experience
Educational Background
Ability to discern 
usefulness of data
Appropriate expertise for 
discipline specific tasks
Overall
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APPENDIX G Face Validity of The Model
Based on the model as you understand it, does it seem useful?
From your understanding of what the model is doing, would the results be believable by your peers in the water system business? 
What are your criticisms of the model?
Where could this modeling approach be used in other places, such as Sewage Systems?






















































APPENDIX H Aggregation Assessments SME-1 and -2
The appendix shows the distributions for each measure scored by the experts and the resulting distribution from the inner loop 
aggregation simulation.
SME1 SME2
Minimum 5.00 Minimum 15.00
Likeliest 30.00 Likeliest 25.00
Maximum 60.00 Maximum 60.00
1 .1 .1 .2
1000 2000 30.00 40.00 5000 60.00
1 .1 .1 .2
|
20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00
1 .1 .1 .2
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1. Ph.D., Engineering Management, Department of Engineering Management and 
Systems Engineering, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA.
2. MS, Systems Engineering, Department of Systems and Information Engineering 
Information, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
3. BS, Mechanical Engineering Technology, University of Southern Mississippi, 
Hattiesburg, MS.
Experience Summary
1. Current research is centered on doctoral dissertation: Quantifying Vulnerability to 
Critical Infrastructure.
2. Six years of experience conducting basic research on military transformational issues, 
future space and air operations, designing complex organizational system value 
models and measures of effectiveness.
3. 19 years of military service in various command, staff and academic positions in the 
US Army
4. Conducted system studies and published numerous papers developing methodologies 
to address infrastructure security, joint military headquarters, and base camp design.
5. Research - focused on the field of cyber risk to supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems (i.e. the computer systems that control critical 
infrastructures); future base camp design (where to locate, what to bring, and optimal 
layout), and joint strike force (future joint C2 headquarters design).
6. Numerous facilitation sessions and workshops, applying the principles of risk 
analysis, decision-making, problem-solving, operations research and systems theory 
to a myriad of military governmental issues.
7. Invited speaker at conferences and workshops chairman in England, Australia, and 
New Zealand regarding novel approaches to amorphous security models for critical 
infrastructures.
Academic and Military Positions
1. Academy Professor Selectee, Department of Systems Engineering, United States 
Military Academy, West Point, New York, December 2002 - June 2003.
2. Analyst, Operations Research Center of Excellence and Assistant Professor, 
Department of Systems Engineering, United States Military Academy, West Point, 
New York, 1998-2002.
3. Battery Commander, C/4-3 Air Defense Artillery, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1995-1996
4. Stinger Platoon Leader, 197th Infantry Brigade (M)(S), Fort Benning, Georgia and 
Desert Shield/Storm, 1990-1993
5. Vulcan Platoon Leader, A/5-5 Air Defense Artillery, Korea 1989-1990
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Presentations and Awards
1. Invited Speaker: Quantifying Vulnerability to Critical Infrastructure, Homeland 
Security Symposium, University of Southern California, 15-16 January 2005.
2. Invited Speaker: Keynote Address, The Amorphous Security Model: Contextual 
security in SCADA and critical infrastructure, Inaugural National SCADA 
Conference ofNew Zealand, upcoming, 28-29 October 2003.
3. Chairman: SCADA Security Technical Workshop, upcoming, 30 October 2003.
4. Invited Speaker: Keynote Address, A Systems-based Vulnerability Assessment 
Methodology for Critical Infrastructure Systems, Australian SCADA Conference, 
Sydney, Australia, 16-17 June 2003.
5. Chairman, Workshop A: Security and Risk Management in SCADA Systems, and 
Conference Chair, Day 2, Sydney, Australia, 18 June 2003.
6. Chairman, Working Group 24 (Measures of Effectiveness) for the Military 
Operations Research Society, June 2003.
7. Chairman, Workshop for Technical Focus on Vulnerability to Critical Infrastructures, 
European SCADA Conference, London, England, 14-16 February 2003.
8. Invited Speaker, Engineering Foundation Conference on Risk-Based Decision­
making in Water Resources IX, October 2002.
9. Panel member and Invited Speaker, Society of American Military Engineers 
Conference June 2001
10. Co-Chairman, Working Group 24 (Measures of Effectiveness) for the Military 
Operations Research Society, 16-18 June 2001.
11. Chairman, Working Group 24 (Measures of Effectiveness) for the Military 
Operations Research Society, 10-12 June 2002.
12. Panel member and Invited Speaker, Engineering Foundation Conference on Risk- 
Based Decision-making in Water Resources IX, October 2000.
13. Recipient of the 1998 Distinguished Graduate Student Award for Outstanding 
Scholarship and Public Service from the Center for Risk Management of Engineering 
Systems, University of Virginia.
14. Invited Keynote Speaker, Institution of Engineers, Australia, Western Australian 
Division: SCADA at the Crossroads 1998, (an international conference at the 
Sheraton Perth Hotel, Western Australia), November 16-19,1998.
15. Commandant’s List graduate, Infantry Officer Advance Course, 1993.
16. Graduated with Honors, University of Southern Mississippi, 1988.
17. Distinguished Military Graduate, University of Southern Mississippi (1988).
Teaching Experience
1. SE401 Introduction to Systems Design (United States Military Academy), Fall 1998.
2. SE402 Systems Design (United States Military Academy), Spring 1998, Fall 1999 
and 2000.
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